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I. INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of the in-house counsel role, or “innkeepers” in 
the terminology of this Article,
1
 is one of the most significant shifts in 
the legal profession over the past half century, and this development 
inevitably has implications for legal scholars, policymakers, and prac-
titioners.
2
  Historically, in-house counsel were stereotyped as inferior 
legal service providers.
3  They were unfairly viewed as lawyers “who 
had not quite made the grade as partner” at their corporation’s prin-
cipal outside law firm.
4
  Today, however, in-house counsel, when 
compared to other legal providers, have a greater potential impact on 
corporate affairs, particularly by curbing corporate opportunism and 
creating value.
5
  A broader conception of the in-house counsel role 
now prevails, and the in-house legal department function has trans-
 
 1 This article uses the terms “innkeeper” and “in-house counsel” as interchange-
able with general counsel, corporate counsel, chief legal officer, and corporate legal 
departments.  The term “innkeeper” serves as a shorthand moniker for the unifying 
theory of the in-house counsel role articulated herein.  The following assertions con-
cerning the impact of in-house counsel on corporate governance are aspirational in 
the sense that in-house counsel’s ability to promote healthy governance is condi-
tioned on the presence of favorable environmental factors. 
 2 See Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 
37 STAN. L. REV. 277, 294 (1985); Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Chal-
lenges in Lawyering for a Global Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY 
L.J. 1057, 1057–59 (1997).  
 3 See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 2, at 277. 
 4 Id. 
 5 See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspec-
tive, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 915 (1990); see also Oliver E. Williamson, Opportunism and Its 
Critics, 14 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 97, 97 (1993) [hereinafter Williamson, Op-
portunism] (defining opportunism as a range of activities involving “self-interest seek-
ing with guile”); Oliver E. Williamson, Strategy Research: Governance and Competence 
Perspectives, 20 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1087, 1099 (1999) [hereinafter Williamson, Strate-
gy] (describing opportunism in broad terms capturing “moral hazard, adverse selec-
tion, shirking, filtering, undisclosed subgoal pursuit, distortions, and all other stra-
tegic deceits”).    
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formed the delivery of legal services.
6
  Moreover, significant im-
provements of in-house lawyer skill and reputation signal a defining 
moment for the legal profession.
7
  A growing number of corpora-
tions, facing increasing costs due to business and legal complexities, 
are deciding to internalize a greater proportion of their legal needs 
in lieu of procuring legal services from the wide array of outside law 
firms available in the marketplace.
8
  Just as greater divisionalization in 
the modern corporation can be explained, to a large extent, through 
transaction-cost economizing, the growth of in-house legal depart-
ments can be viewed through a similar lens.
9
 
Despite these important developments, there is a relative dearth 
of legal scholarship dedicated to this transformation, as well as its pa-
 
 6 See Daly, supra note 2, at 1063; David E. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New 
Model of the Corporate Attorney/Client Relationship, in CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 2009 
669, 692–93 (2010) (discussing the impact of in-house counsel on corporate pro-
curement of legal services).  
 7 See Steven L. Schwarcz, To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation, 
33 J. CORP. L. 497, 498 (2008); see also George P. Baker & Rachel Parkin, The Changing 
Structure of the Legal Services Industry and the Careers of Lawyers, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1635, 
1637 (2006).  
 8 See generally Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, 
Attributes, 19 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1537 (1981) [hereinafter Williamson, Modern Corpo-
ration] (arguing that the modern corporation evolved in part by a desire to reduce 
transaction costs and other economic factors); Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Inte-
gration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112 (1971) [he-
reinafter Williamson, Vertical] (analyzing the benefits of internalization versus exter-
nal procurement).  In fact, “[i]n-house legal departments were the fastest-growing 
‘legal services sector’ around the world over the last five years.  In some markets, the 
growth reflects a compound increase of 15% per year.”  Richard Stock, The Future for 
In-House Counsel, INSIDER CORP. LEGAL, June 2008, at 1; see also JOHN C. COFFEE JR., 
GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 223 (2006) (“As of 2002, 
there were some 65,000 in-house counsel in the United States.”); Baker & Parkin, su-
pra note 7, at 1654 (“Corporate legal departments have exhibited significant growth 
since the early 1980s and have continued this trend in recent years.  Between 1998 
and 2004, the 200 largest in-house legal departments grew from a total of 24,000 to 
27,500 lawyers.”); Daly, supra note 2, at 1059 (“Between 1970 and 1980, there was a 
forty percent increase in the number of lawyers working in-house; and between 1980 
and 1991, there was a thirty-three percent increase.”). 
 9 See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (asserting 
that in order to minimize transaction costs, it may be optimal to bring various labor 
functions within the firm to prevent costly “spot” labor market transactions); Wil-
liamson, Modern Corporation, supra note 8, at 1537 (“[T]he modern corporation is 
mainly to be understood as the product of a series of organizational innovations that 
have had the purpose and effect of economizing on transaction costs.”).  See generally 
ALFRED D. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE (1962) (discussing strategic divisionalization of the modern 
corporation). 
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rallel impact on business enterprises.
10
  A concise, all-encompassing 
theory of the in-house counsel role has proven elusive for legal scho-
lars.  Most of the debate surrounding in-house counsel clusters 
around issues of independence and ethics for the purpose of analyz-
ing the willingness and capacity of in-house counsel to perform their 
multiple roles, particularly gatekeeping.
11
  Ironically, legal observers, 
with a few exceptions, have given very little attention to the analysis of 
how in-house counsel create value in the event these concerns re-
garding willingness and capacity are dispelled.
12
  To be fair, argu-
ments concerning in-house counsel’s willingness and capability to 
take certain actions, as compared to outside counsel’s, may have 
some validity, but these arguments are often overstated, conclusory, 
 
 10 See Daly, supra note 2, at 1067 (“Unfortunately, scholarly writers and research-
ers have paid very little attention to the combined effect of the growth in number, 
prestige, and power of in-house counsel and the globalization of the business and 
capital markets.”); see also Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of Corporate Counsel, 
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 957 (2005) (“[G]eneral counsel’s position has a paradoxical 
quality: While a lawyer who serves as general counsel of a large corporation holds the 
clearly defined power associated with a hierarchical position in a large bureaucratic 
organization, the position itself is ambiguous in many ways that may prove troub-
ling.”). 
 11 See, e.g., Miriam Hechler Baer, Corporate Policing and Corporate Governance: What 
Can We Learn from Hewlett-Packard’s Pretexting Scandal?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 523, 580 
(2008).   
     Board members lack the expertise to directly monitor the private 
law enforcers who are conducting investigations . . . . The company’s 
internal counsel will therefore be relied upon to both monitor and de-
sign the corporation’s police function.  Corporate counsel, however, 
may either be too aligned with the company’s investigators . . . or too 
out of the loop . . . to provide adequate guidance or oversight. 
Id.; see also Chayes & Chayes, supra note 2, at 298 (“[C]orporate counsel’s office may 
not be as professionally independent (although most general counsel would dispute 
it). This impression may account for the failure of corporate counsel to attract many 
students from prestige law schools.”); Daly, supra note 2, at 1099 (“Whether in-house 
counsel can exercise the required degree of independence is a question that has un-
iversally troubled the legal profession.”); Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 446–60 (2008) (discussing whether in-house counsel are 
willing and have the capacity to monitor for misconduct as well as whether they have 
the capacity to interdict wrongdoers). 
 12 Stephen Schwarcz addresses in-house counsel value creation exclusively from 
the perspective of transactional lawyering. See Schwarcz, supra note 7; see also Lyman 
Johnson & Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers Advised About Fiduciary Duties?, 64 BUS. 
LAW. 1105, 1110, 1119 (2009) (discussing how in-house counsel are well-suited to ad-
vise officers on conduct that is harmful to the corporation).  But value creation can 
also be seen in other key areas such as compliance and litigation.  See discussion infra 
Part IV.B.2. 
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and lack empirical validation.
13
  A debate on whether in-house coun-
sel can, or better yet under what circumstances they can, effectively 
carry out certain functions should not trump the fundamental analy-
sis of how in-house counsel create value.  These two lines of inquiry 
can and should co-exist in harmony.  The inability of legal scholars to 
expand the in-house counsel inquiry beyond independence is short-
sighted and could lead to perverse consequences.  For example, this 
dilemma is particularly evident within the European Union competi-
tion law context, where the European courts’ negative perception of 
in-house counsel (i.e., the inability to render independent judgment) 
has influenced the denial of legal privilege to in-house counsel com-
munications.
14
  As a consequence, this narrow perspective forces cor-
porations to undertake less effective and more costly measures 
through outside counsel, even where the use of in-house counsel 
would be optimal.
15
  Moreover, this perspective may operate to sup-
press vital internal communications or information flow that would 
otherwise lead to the early identification and resolution of legal is-
sues. 
 
 13 Compare Kim, supra note 11, at 413 (claiming that corporate scandals in the 
twenty-first century have “lent support to the general consensus that insider lawyers 
are too ‘captured’ to exercise the independent judgment that is the hallmark of pro-
fessionalism” and “have cast doubt about inside counsel’s ability to fulfill their role as 
‘gatekeepers’”), with Daly, supra note 2, at 1100 (“Critics insist that a lawyer who is 
dependent on a single client, i.e., the corporate employer . . . cannot provide inde-
pendent advice and judgment of the same caliber as outside counsel whose financial 
ties to a single client are presumably much weaker.  While this criticism may still lin-
ger in some corners of the professional responsibility community in the United 
States, bar association ethics committees and the courts in their capacity as regulators 
of the legal profession have soundly rejected it.”), Sarah Helene Duggin, The Pivotal 
Role of the General Counsel in Promoting Corporate Integrity and Professional Responsibility, 
51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 989, 1008 (2007) (“When suspicions of significant problems with 
potentially serious legal consequences arise within organizations it is often the gen-
eral counsel who persuades corporate constituents of the need to pursue the matter 
and initiates an internal investigation.”), and E. Norman Veasey, Separate and Continu-
ing Counsel for Independent Directors: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come as a General 
Practice, 59 BUS. LAW. 1413, 1414 (2004) (“My thesis is that there should be a pre-
sumption that the general counsel is competent, has adequate resources, is ethical, 
and not conflicted in giving unvarnished advice to all the directors in carrying out 
their fiduciary duties.”). 
 14 Joined Cases T-125/03 & T-253/03, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd. & Akros 
Chemicals Ltd v. Comm’n, 2007 E. C. R. II-3523 ¶¶ 167–71; Case 155/79, AM&S Eu-
rope Limited v. Comm’n, 1982 E.C.R. 1575 ¶¶ 21–22; see also Carolyn Lamm, ABA 
President, Remarks at the American Law Institute 87th Annual Meeting, May 17, 
2010 (discussing the denial of attorney-client privilege to in-house counsel in Eu-
rope), available at http://2010am.ali.org/videos.cfm?video_id=2. 
 15 For a detailed discussion of the advantages in-house counsel provide, see infra 
Part IV. 
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Understanding the value of in-house counsel starts with the ex-
amination of the environment within which modern corporations 
function.  According to Adolf Berle, the modern corporation’s quest 
to capture and preserve the economic power created by its activities is 
constrained by competition, profits, political intervention, and public 
sentiment.
16
  Similarly, business economist Michael Porter identifies 
five forces that limit corporate economic power: industry competi-
tors, potential entrants, buyers, suppliers, and substitutes.
17
  Although 
the aforementioned factors are not exhaustive, a common thread 
runs through them all; they threaten the corporation’s capacity to 
create value.
18
  Corporations require legal support as an indispensible 
aid to manage these ongoing threats, which often involve a legal 
component.  Examples such as failure to comply with a federal regu-
lation, a poorly written supply contract, or a mishandled product law-
suit, all constitute a threat to corporate value.  Prudent corporate 
managers cannot wait until such threats materialize; they require a 
type of consistent and strategic guidance that in-house counsel are 
uniquely positioned to provide.
19
 
The evolving role of in-house counsel can be expressed in terms 
of value creation, which is the corporation’s raison d’être.
20
  Value 
can be both tangible and intangible and the particular metric for val-
ue may vary depending on the context or particular vantage point 
(e.g., corporation, employees, customers, financial experts, marke-
ters, or society).
21
  Consequently, there are numerous formulations of 
the value-creation concept in the business literature.
22
  Legal observ-
ers such as Ronald Gilson have also applied the value-creation con-
cept to business lawyers.
23
  Yet, the available definitions of business-
 
 16 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 39, 54, 58 
(1954).   
 17 MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND SUSTAINING 
SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 6 (1985).   
 18 See infra app. fig.1.  
 19 See Johnson & Garvis, supra note 12, at 1110, 1119. 
 20 See TIM HINDLE, THE ECONOMIST GUIDE TO MANAGEMENT IDEAS AND GURUS 201 
(2008). 
 21 See id. at 201–02.  These issues create considerable debate on what metrics are 
the best proxies for corporate value (e.g., stock price, accounting or book value, net 
present value of future cash flows).  Id.  For example, financial experts may focus on 
metrics such as share price or book value as a proxy for value, whereas marketers may 
rely on more intangible measures such as perceived customer value above cost.  Id. 
 22 See id. 
 23 Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 
94 YALE L.J. 239, 243 (1985) (“If what a business lawyer does has value, a transaction must 
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lawyer value creation, although helpful, are descriptively too narrow 
for the in-house counsel role because they (i) are often limited to 
transactional sources of value; (ii) are fragmented; or (iii) fail to cap-
ture the unique value that stems from in-house counsel linkages, net-
works, and integration with other firm activities.
24
  This Article builds 
upon the existing business-lawyer value creation literature by articu-
lating a robust unifying theory of the in-house counsel role—a dy-
namic concept involving the interaction of multiple parties and activ-
ities in the employment of corporate resources.  In-house counsel 
value is not simply a function of individual value-producing activities; 
it also encompasses the networked and embedded nature of the role, 
which contributes to the enhancement of corporate value and com-
petitive advantage in unique ways that outside counsel cannot easily 
replicate.
25
 
Specifically, this Article posits that the strategic in-house counsel 
role, embodying consistent interaction with corporate operations and 
actors (e.g., management and employees), enables the modern cor-
poration to significantly enhance its creation of value.  Paradoxically, 
this theory further illustrates that being an innkeeper (i.e., an em-
bedded employee with a single client) is not a vice as many legal ob-
servers often assume, but rather is a virtue promoting more pragmat-
ic resolutions to a range of corporate issues.
26
  When completed by 
competent professionals with well-honed ethical sensibilities, the stra-
tegic tasks that in-house counsel undertake add value because they 
are fundamentally different from the largely tactical outside law firm 
 
be worth more, net of legal fees, as a result of the lawyer’s participation.” (emphasis in the 
original)).   
 24 See generally id.; Schwarcz, supra note 7.   
 25 See PORTER, supra note 17, at 36.  According to Michael Porter, in-house coun-
sel function as part of a firm’s value chain, “a collection of activities that are per-
formed to design, produce, market, deliver, and support its product.”  Id.  “The value 
chain is a theory of the firm that views the firm as a collection of discrete but related 
production functions, if production functions are defined as activities.”  Id. at 39 n.3.  
Specifically, Porter categorizes legal departments as providing support activities like 
finance, accounting, and government affairs that support a firm’s primary activities 
such as manufacturing.  Id. at 38–43.  Porter argues that “value activities [both pri-
mary and support] are the building blocks of competitive advantage” that operate 
individually and as part of “a system of interdependent activities” to create value.  Id. 
at 48. 
 26 See Ben Heineman, Caught in the Middle, CORP. COUNS., Apr. 2007, at 1–2 (as-
serting that general counsel must act as both “guardians” and “partners”); see also 
Williamson, Strategy, supra note 5, at 1090 (“The efficacy of governance is thus jointly 
determined by local efforts (self-help to craft mechanisms) and as a function of the 
institutional environment (polity; judiciary; laws of property and contract).”).  
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role.  Beyond providing a more robust descriptive assessment of the 
in-house counsel function, our theory has significant implications for 
corporate governance, the legal profession, and legal education. 
Part II of this Article explores the reasons for the under-
examination of in-house counsel.  First, it describes factors that have 
impeded a more probing analysis of in-house counsel in corporate 
legal scholarship, namely, corporate complexity, shareholder-director 
dualism, and the overemphasis on symbolic procedural mechanisms.  
Second, it explores gaps in the corporate law framework that often 
glance over operational details and the important internal function 
of in-house counsel. 
Part III describes the historical and environmental factors that 
led to the emergence of in-house counsel and corporate legal de-
partments.  This Part specifically examines the impact of the follow-
ing factors on the emergence of in-house counsel: (i) the growth of 
the modern multi-division corporation, (ii) the shifting legal land-
scape, and (iii) the nature of legal services (i.e., the fungibility of le-
gal services and the presence of credence characteristics). 
Part IV articulates a unifying theory of the in-house counsel role.  
This theory illustrates how the strategic tasks in-house counsel under-
take add value, in large part, because they are fundamentally differ-
ent from the typical tactical role of outside law firms.  The linkages, 
networks, and embeddedness characterizing the relationship between 
in-house counsel and other firm activities contribute to corporate 
value in unique ways.  In order to provide a more robust descriptive 
assessment of in-house counsel value creation, this Part explores 
three questions: (i) What are the unique attributes of the in-house 
counsel role? (ii) What are the transactional and non-transactional 
sources of value created by in-house counsel? and (iii) Who are the 
internal and external beneficiaries of that value? 
Part V addresses the significant implications of our theory for 
corporate governance, the legal profession, and legal education.  
Specifically, these implications highlight (i) the need for legal scho-
lars and lawmakers to look inward in order to enhance corporate go-
vernance from the inside-out, (ii) a heightened corporate client focus 
on value and trusted partnerships (as opposed to independence) 
with respect to the provision of internal and external legal services, 
and (iii) legal education trends with greater emphasis on training for 
the in-house corporate setting.  Finally, this Part proposes some addi-
tional areas for further research. 
SIMMONS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2011  12:24 PM 
86 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:77 
 
II. REASONS FOR IN-HOUSE COUNSEL UNDER-EXAMINATION 
A. Omissions in the Corporate Legal Scholarship
27
 
Corporate governance describes “all of the devices, institutions, 
and mechanisms by which corporations are governed.”
28
  This broad 
definition inevitably captures the under-examined nature of the in-
house counsel function.  Legal observers have examined, at length, a 
wide array of mechanisms to address the quintessential agency-cost 
problem described by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in the 1930s.
29
  
To address this problem, John Coffee identifies two strategies that 
have emerged among investors: (i) a legal strategy emphasizing ex post 
litigation, and (ii) an ex ante gatekeeper function relying on profes-
sional agents (i.e., third parties) to monitor management and alert 
investors to opportunistic behavior.
30
  Notably, Coffee’s gatekeeper 
definition excludes internal actors like in-house counsel.
31
  In an at-
tempt to promote better corporate governance, legal observers have 
 
 27 Portions of this Part were recently published in Omari Scott Simmons, The Un-
der-Examination of In-House Counsel, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 145 (2009).  
 28 Compare JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPRATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES 
BROKEN 2 (2008), with Lawrence A. Cunningham, Comparative Corporate Governance 
and Pedagogy, 34 GA. L. REV. 721, 722 (2000) (“I take the phrase ‘governance’ to 
mean the collection of law and practice that regulates the conduct of those in con-
trol of a business organization.”). 
 29 See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (describing how the separation of own-
ership and control gives rise to conflicts of interest between shareholders and man-
agement); see also infra app. fig.2. 
 30 COFFEE, supra note 8, at 9. 
To reduce these asymmetries, investors have two basic strategies that 
they can follow: First, they can employ an essentially legal strategy and 
rely on litigation in order to hold their corporate managers and agents 
accountable and redress any breach of fiduciary duty or contract right.  
Second, the major alternative to such a law-centered system is to rely 
on gatekeepers—that is, on professional agents who will monitor man-
agement and alert shareholders as to opportunistic behavior by their 
managers.  This latter system works less based on litigation or even pri-
vate contracting, and more based on bonding and reputational capital.  
The first strategy works ex post, while the second operates ex ante, seek-
ing to detect and prevent problems before they become crises.  The 
aim of both strategies, however, is to reduce informational asymmetries 
(and thereby produce a more transparent market). 
Id. 
 31 See id. at 7 (“In the absence of independent professionals—auditors, attor-
neys[,] and analysts—boards will predictably receive a stream of selectively edited in-
formation from corporate managers that presents the incumbent management in 
the most favorable light possible.”). 
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(i) looked outside to third party gatekeepers, reputational interme-
diaries, and the market;
32
 and (ii) emphasized democratically symbol-
ic procedures reflecting values such as independence, participation, 
and transparency.
33
  This quest for outside oversight and the attractive 
appeal of symbolic democratic structures as a means to prevent ma-
nagerial opportunism, even if valuable, should not preclude the im-
portant task of improving the corporation’s internal capacities.  De-
scriptively, the corporation itself is more bureaucratic than 
democratic, and reform must address this institutional reality.
34
 
The best prospects for corporate governance depend on leverag-
ing a balance of internal and external capabilities.  The valuable 
function of in-house counsel is perhaps the most salient example of 
embedding law into corporate operations and organizational cul-
ture.
35
  Before embarking on an in-depth analysis of the in-house 
counsel role, it is instructive to highlight the key reasons for the omis-
sion of in-house counsel from the legal literature, namely: (i) the dif-
ficulty of addressing corporate complexity,
36
 (ii) the preoccupation 
with director-shareholder dualism,
37
 and (iii) the overemphasis on 
 
 32 See infra app. fig.2.  See generally COFFEE, supra note 8. 
 33 Simmons, supra note 27, at 146–49; see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 395 (1983); Lawrence Mitchell, 
Protect Industry from Predatory Speculators, FIN. TIMES (London), July 9, 2009, at 9 (hig-
hlighting the tension between envisioning the corporation as a democracy versus a 
bureaucracy); Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of 
Executive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 341–42 (2009).  
 34 See id.; see also Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic 
Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1390 (2006).  Notwithstanding, the corpora-
tion functions as an ubiquitous institutional force in modern democracy.  See e.g., Cit-
izens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 Sup. Ct. 876 (2010) (holding that the 
First Amendment does not ban corporate funding of independent political cam-
paign advertisements). 
 35 See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert V. Ricca, (Not) Advising Corporate Officers 
About Fiduciary Duties, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 663, 688–90 (2007) (describing how 
general counsel should create a corporate code of conduct and help create a culture 
of legal compliance among senior officers and employees).   
 36 See, e.g., DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN 
CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM 6–10 (2005) (highlighting three 
enduring issues that stifle regulators: risk taking, competition, and complexity of or-
ganizations); Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1565, 1587 (1993) (arguing corporate law must acknowledge technical 
and normative complexity to retain its legitimacy). 
 37 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 8–12 (2008) (discussing shareholder primacy, director primacy, mana-
gerialism and stakeholder theoretical approaches). 
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symbolic procedures reflecting democratic values like indepen-
dence.
38
 
1. Complexity 
First, the difficulty with developing a concise theory of in-house 
counsel stems in part from the complexity of the role.
39
  In-house 
counsel are the “Swiss army knife” of the legal profession.
40
  Existing 
theories, standing alone, fail to capture this complexity.  They are too 
abstract and do not account for institutional or operational detail.  
Moreover, “[r]eality is too complicated and admits of too many inte-
ractions to be modeled.”
41
  On the other hand, the value of theory is 
not limited to its ability to make accurate predictions or simply reflect 
reality; it extends to the ability to enhance the understanding of real 
world phenomena.
42
  A presumption of immeasurability that often at-
taches to complexity may be so strong that it precludes attempts to 
make observations about the so-called immeasurable value of in-
house counsel.
43
  A more pragmatic approach to examining in-house 
counsel is to consider whether theory can improve upon the existing 
knowledge of in-house counsel value creation and the concomitant 
impact of in-house counsel on corporate governance, the legal pro-
fession, and legal education.
44
 
 
 38 See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 27, at 341–42 (explaining that procedural re-
quirements that mandate independence in the context of corporate governance may 
not achieve their objectives). 
 39 See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, The Tensions, Stresses, 
and Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation, 62 BUS. LAW. 1, 5 (2006) 
(“A major factor contributing to the variety and complexity of the tensions faced by 
the general counsel is the multiplicity of roles counsel is expected to play.”).     
 40 See Duggin, supra note 13, at 1003–20 (noting the various roles of general 
counsel, which include legal advisor, educator on legal compliance, transactions faci-
litator, company advocate in litigation and with governmental authorities, investiga-
tor into potential legal issues within the organization, compliance officer, corporate 
ethics officer, manager of law department and of outside legal resources, manage-
ment committee member, strategic planner, legal services marketer, ad hoc planning 
advisor, ethics counselor, crisis manger, and arbitrator).  
 41 Gilson, supra note 23, at 251. 
 42 See id. at 252.  But see Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in 
ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3–4 (1953) (asserting that the value of theory hinges 
on its ability to make accurate predictions). 
 43 See DOUGLAS W. HUBBARD, HOW TO MEASURE ANYTHING: FINDING THE VALUE OF 
INTANGIBLES IN BUSINESS xi–xiv (2007). 
 44 See discussion infra Part V. 
SIMMONS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2011  12:24 PM 
2011] INNKEEPERS: A UNIFYING THEORY 89 
 
2. Director-Shareholder Dualism 
The second reason for the omission of in-house counsel from 
the corporate governance literature is a preoccupation with a direc-
tor-shareholder dualism that overlooks the impact of a range of in-
ternal actors such as in-house counsel on corporate governance.  A 
corporation is much more than directors and shareholders; it is a 
complex bureaucracy composed of multiple layers of management, 
where decision making occurs at all levels of the firm on an inter-
temporal basis.
45
  The legal literature often vacillates between share-
holder or director primacy with occasional detours.
46
  Even the more 
recent focus on gatekeepers is limited because observers often reflect 
a bias for outside actors versus internal agents of the corporation.
47
  
Although the gatekeeper hypothesis rightly assumes the inevitability 
of outsourcing certain compliance responsibilities to independent 
third parties, this does not obviate the need for complementary in-
ternal legal counsel who are willing, able, and valuable.
48
 
 
 45 Johnson & Garvis, supra note 12, 1108 n.23 (discussing how corporate law scho-
larship has largely neglected the role of corporate officers); see also Lyman P.Q. John-
son & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1597, 1600–01, 1609–10 (2005); Usha Rodrigues, From Loyalty to Conflict: Address-
ing Fiduciary Duty at the Officer Level, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2009) (discussing the impor-
tance of conflict enforcement at the officer level). 
 46 See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 37, at 8–12; see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn 
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 301 (1999) (ac-
knowledging directors, within their discretion, may consider non-shareholder inter-
ests in order to maximize the joint welfare of all firm stakeholders); Lisa M. Fairfax, 
The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, 31 J. 
CORP. L. 675, 698 (2006) (describing the impact of stakeholder rhetoric); Marleen 
O’Connor-Felman, Labor’s Role in the American Corporate Governance Structure, 22 COMP. 
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 97, 100 (2000).   
 47 See, e.g., COFFEE, supra note 8, at 7.  
The board of directors in the United States is today composed of direc-
tors who are essentially part-time performers with other demanding re-
sponsibilities.  So structured, the board is blind, except to the extent 
that the corporation’s managers or its independent gatekeepers advise 
it of impending problems.  In the absence of independent profession-
als—auditors, attorneys[,] and analysts—boards will predictably receive 
a stream of selectively edited information from corporate managers 
that presents the incumbent management in the most favorable light 
possible. 
Id.; see also Kim, supra note 11, at 415 (“[G]atekeeping scholars have traditionally 
conceived the gatekeeper as an outside professional services firm which has a contrac-
tual relationship with the primary enforcement target (the client).”); Reinier H. 
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L. ECON. & 
ORG. 53, 62 (1986).   
 48 See discussion infra Parts IV, V.A. 
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3. Symbolic Procedural Mechanisms 
The third and arguably most important reason for the omission 
of in-house counsel from the corporate governance literature is the 
overemphasis on symbolic procedural mechanisms reflecting inde-
pendence to achieve effective governance and compliance with law. 
When assessing the quality of corporate reform or reformers, corpo-
rate constituents view the degree of independence as a heuristic for 
value.
49
  This symbolic attachment or so-called “fetishization” of inde-
pendence has blinded some observers to the impact of in-house 
counsel’s value-creation role.
50
  The most prevalent critique of in-
house counsel in the corporate governance literature contends that 
in-house counsel’s lack of independence or capture makes them less 
effective gatekeepers than outside lawyers or other reputational in-
termediaries in promoting healthy corporate governance.  John Cof-
fee’s seminal book examining the critical role of gatekeepers on cor-
porate governance embraces this critique: 
While the outside attorney has been increasingly relegated to a 
specialist’s role and is seldom sought for statesman-like advice, the 
in-house general counsel seems even less suited to play a gate-
keeping role.  First, the in-house counsel is less an independent 
professional—indeed he is far more exposed to pressure and re-
prisals than even the outside audit partner.  Second, the in-house 
counsel is seldom a reputational intermediary (as law and ac-
counting firms that serve multiple clients are) because the in-
 
 49 See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 33, at 359–60; Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, 
The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 
921, 921–22 (1999); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Boards: Law, Norms, 
and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 799 
(2001) (“Current policymaking initiatives show an increasing tendency to assume the 
benefits of director independence and accountability, and hence the self-evident de-
sirability of legal reforms to promote them.”). 
 50 See Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 447 
(2008). 
[I]ndependent directors are useful only in situations where a conflict 
exists.  An independent director—a part-timer whose contact with the 
corporation is necessarily limited—is not inherently better suited to 
further the interests of shareholders than an inside director.  Current 
rules thus over-rely on independence, transforming an essentially nega-
tive quality—lack of ties to the corporation—into an end in itself, and 
thereby fetishizing independence. 
Id. 
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house counsel cannot easily develop reputational capital that is 
personal and independent from the corporate client. 
51
 
The independence or capture critique, even if we assume it is valid, is 
often accepted by observers without a robust inquiry or empirical va-
lidation and does not adequately explore demand-side benefits.
52
  It is 
a causation fallacy to assume that due to the employee status of in-
house counsel, they are ineffective as gatekeepers or that outside 
counsel are more likely to act with virtue.  Even if outside counsel and 
other gatekeepers were more willing to monitor, “inside counsel have 
an overwhelming advantage in their ability to monitor.”
53
  The eco-
nomic pressures that may constrain in-house counsel also remain an 
issue for outside law firms.
54
 
The broader question is not necessarily the need for indepen-
dence, but for virtuous agents to remain “faithful” to their profession 
and the client corporation.
55
  Ultimately, this is a question of (i) law-
yer competence, and (ii) a shared understanding among corporate 
management and in-house counsel as to the latter’s appropriate 
role.
56
  Independence is rarely an issue until a conflict arises and most 
of the value-creating functions and daily duties performed by in-
house counsel do not raise conflicts.
57
  Thus, a myopic focus on inde-
pendence ignores a significant amount of value created by in-house 
counsel that may outweigh the risks and probabilities associated with 
 
 51 COFFEE, supra note 8, at 195; see also Ben W. Heineman, Jr., The General Counsel 
as Lawyer-Statesman, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 5, 2010, 
11:17 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/09/05/the-general-
counsel-as-lawyer-statesman (describing the changing legal landscape in which the 
role of general counsel has greater importance and value, but only in corporations 
that pair high performance with high integrity).  
 52 But see Bhagat & Black, supra note 49, at 936 tbl.2 (empirical study showing that 
independence of directors had no appreciable impact on share price). 
 53  Kim, supra note 11, at 417; see also Johnson & Garvis, supra note 12, at 1110, 
1119–20. 
 54 See Duggin, supra note 13, at 1035 (“[T]he report of the ABA Task Force on 
Corporate Responsibility specifically notes that ‘[t]he competition to acquire and 
keep client business, [like] the desire to advance within the corporate executive 
structure, may induce lawyers to seek to please the corporate officials with whom they 
deal rather than to focus on the long-term interest of their client, the corporation.’” 
(quoting AM. BAR ASS’N, RECOMMENDATIONS OF AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK 
FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (Mar. 31, 2003), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/media/corpgov.pdf)). 
 55 See Rodrigues, supra note 50, at 451. 
 56 See discussion infra Part V.B. 
 57 See Rodrigues, supra note 50, at 487. 
SIMMONS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2011  12:24 PM 
92 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:77 
 
conflicts.
58
  While singing the virtues of independence, one cannot 
ignore the tangible and intangible value created by in-house coun-
sel.
59
  Instead of excluding in-house counsel from the corporate go-
vernance debate, one should consider how the input of in-house 
counsel could positively impact business enterprises and the design of 
corporate reform.
60
 
B. Omissions in the Legal Backdrop
61
 
The legacies of Enron Corp., Citigroup, Inc., American Interna-
tional Group, Inc. (AIG), and other examples of corporate dysfunc-
tion reveal that traditional corporate law and the presence of third-
party gatekeepers do not, alone, adequately address the problem of 
corporate opportunism.
62
  Traditional corporate law and theory say 
very little about the internal corporate organization, multiple layers 
of management, and how companies in specific industries should le-
gally pursue the efficient production of products and services that 
customers value.
63
  Corporate operations are the sum of various 
processes such as manufacturing, sales and marketing, finance and 
accounting, information technology, and research and develop-
ment.
64
  It is these internal operational processes in conjunction with 
corporate culture and external forces (e.g., markets) that ultimately 
determine the profitability and sustainability of business enterprise. 
 
 58 See Duggin, supra note 13, at 1034 (explaining how outside counsel may lack 
sufficient knowledge to effectively solve a legal problem for an organization, and how 
management may give outside counsel “selected” facts that will “circumvent unfavor-
able advice” from inside counsel). 
 59 See Gilson, supra note 5, at 915; see also Duggin, supra note 13, at 1036 (noting 
that in certain situations, hiring “independent” counsel may be done at the expense 
of the shareholders and the company).  
 60 See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 61 Portions of this Part were recently published in Omari Scott Simmons, Corpo-
rate Governance Reform as a Credence Service, 5 J. BUS. & TECH L. 113 (2010). 
 62 Id. at 115.  See generally Michael Lewitt, Wall Street’s Next Big Problem, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 16, 2008, at A29 (discussing the looming failure of AIG and its use of default 
credit swaps); Jeffrey L. Seglin, The Right Thing: Will More Rules Yield Better Corporate 
Behavior?, N.Y. TIMES , Nov. 17, 2002, at B4 (describing Enron as an example of bad 
corporate behavior).    
 63 See Johnson & Garvis, supra note 12, at 1106-07, Johnson & Millon, supra note 
45, at 1609–10; Lawrence Mitchell, Vulnerability and Efficiency (of What?), 2 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 153 (2005); see also Langevoort, supra note 49, at 807–08 (describing the un-
derestimation of middle management in the study of corporate governance).  But see 
Gantler v. Stevens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009) (recognizing the application of 
fiduciary duties to corporate officers as well as directors).  
 64 See PORTER, supra note 17, at 38–43.   
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In a sense, corporate law functions like book ends and does not 
address a broad range of corporate activity, leaving it to managers, in 
most cases, to fill the gaps.  Most routine operational decisions fall in-
to the category of enterprise decisions.
65
  Enterprise decisions are 
standard decisions made by management, such as the decision to 
build a foreign production plant or what products to produce.
66
  
These decisions are often protected under state law through the 
business judgment rule that rightfully vests in directors the authority 
and protection to make countless corporate decisions (often relying 
on skilled managers and advisors) without the prospect of judicial in-
tervention.
67
  Meanwhile, the federal government, to a large extent 
through the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), regulates 
the external trading of securities and disclosure without addressing 
the internal affairs of the corporation.
68
 
On balance, American corporate law is conservative in form and 
function.  Here, the use of the conservative label is value neutral.  
 
 65 See generally E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in 
America, 52 BUS. LAW. 393, 394 (1997) (discussing the types of decisions Delaware 
courts address, which include enterprise, ownership, and oversight decisions).   
 66 See id.  Ownership decisions involve ownership changes, such as mergers, ac-
quisitions, and corporate takeovers. Oversight decisions concern managers’ monitor-
ing role, such as ensuring employees execute their responsibilities in compliance 
with the law.  See id. 
 67 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).  Robert Clark describes 
the business judgment rule as follows: 
The rule is simply that the business judgment of the directors will not 
be challenged or overturned by courts or shareholders, and the direc-
tors will not be held liable for the consequences of their exercise of 
business judgment—even for judgments that appear to have been clear 
mistakes—unless certain exceptions apply. 
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.4, 123–36 (1986); see also FRANKLIN A. 
GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 278–79 (2000) (“After all, business decisions typically 
involve taking calculated risks.”); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Busi-
ness Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439 (2005) (arguing that the business judgment rule 
should not extend to corporate officers in the same way as directors); Lawrence Ha-
mermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A 
Reply to Professor Johnson, 60. BUS. LAW 865 (2005) (critiquing Johnson’s argument for 
a liability scheme holding officers liable for negligence).  In Delaware and many oth-
er states, directors receive an additional layer of legal protection from exculpation 
statutes that cover violations of fiduciary duty, but not breaches of the duty of loyalty 
and good faith.  DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2010). 
 68 See Simmons, supra note 27, at 327–29; Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How 
We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 673, 674–79 (2005).  But see Robert B. Thompson & Hilary A. Sale, Securities 
Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 872–73, 
878 (2003) (asserting that federal securities laws indirectly impose fiduciary duties on 
officers via disclosure and certification). 
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Historically, corporate lawmakers have been reluctant to upset the in-
ternal power relationships between management and shareholders or 
to address operational details.
69
  Instead lawmakers have (i) out-
sourced such reform to third party gatekeepers, reputational inter-
mediaries, and the market;
70
 (ii) emphasized democratically symbolic 
procedures reflecting values such as independence, participation, 
and transparency;
71
 and (iii) regulated business activity indirectly or 
outside of the traditional corporate law context (e.g., tax, antitrust, 
environmental, banking, and labor laws).
72
  Thus, the content of tra-
ditional corporate law contains significant gaps, lacks a degree of 
contextual specificity, and provides substantial managerial discretion, 
making its impact on corporate governance (e.g., opportunism) diffi-
cult to discern. 
III. DETERMINANTS OF IN-HOUSE COUNSEL EMERGENCE 
A. The Complexity of the Modern Corporation 
1. Divisionalization, Business Units, and Functions 
Although there are many factors contributing to the complexity 
and form of the modern corporation, its current shape is largely a 
function of minimizing transaction costs.
73
  Observers such as Oliver 
Williamson acknowledge the confluence of factors explaining the 
modern organizational form but prefer the explanatory power of the 
transaction cost narrative.
74
 
 
 69 See Johnson & Garvis, supra note 12, at 1106–09.  
 70 See generally COFFEE, supra note 8; Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government 
Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389 (2003) (highlighting situations where government regu-
lators have outsourced not only services but the origination and implementation of 
regulatory policy).  
 71 See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 33; Mitchell, supra note 63, at 9 
(highlighting the tension between envisioning the corporation as a democracy versus 
a bureaucracy); Simmons, supra note 27, at 341–42.  
 72 See CLARK, supra note 67, at § 1.4, 30–32.  There are, however, numerous laws 
and regulations impacting business enterprise that should not be overlooked.  See id. 
 73 Williamson, Modern Corporation, supra note 8, at 1537 (“While I recognize that 
there have been numerous contributing factors, I submit that the modern corpora-
tion is mainly to be understood as the product of a series of organizational innova-
tions that have had the purpose and effect of economizing on transaction costs.”).  
 74 Id. at 1537.  Williamson makes the following observations: 
     Note that I do not argue that the modern corporation is to be un-
derstood exclusively in these terms.  Other important factors include 
the quest for monopoly gains and the imperatives of technology.  
These mainly have a bearing on market shares and on the absolute size 
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Perhaps the greatest functional innovation in the development 
of the modern corporation was the emergence of the M-form, or 
multidivisional corporation, with “many distinct operating units and 
management by a hierarchy of salaried executives.”
75
  In theory, the 
board of directors manages the modern corporation, yet it delegates 
management authority to the CEO and senior executives.
76
  Observers 
like the late Alfred Chandler assert that delegation to professional 
management was necessary to address transaction costs in the com-
plex, modern, multi-division, publicly traded company.
77
  Chandler 
specifically described the benefits of the M-form: 
The basic reason for [the M-form’s] success was simply that it 
clearly removed the executives responsible for the destiny of the 
entire enterprise from the more routine operational activities, 
and so gave them the time, information, and even psychological 
commitment for long term planning and appraisal . . . [T]he new 
structure left the broad strategic decisions as to the allocation of 
existing resources and the acquisition of new ones in the hands of 
a top team of generalists.  Relieved of operating duties and tactic-
al decisions, a general executive was less likely to reflect the posi-
tion of just one part of the whole.
78
 
Notwithstanding these advances, the separation of ownership and 
control between managers and shareholders created an additional set 
 
of specific technological units; but decisions to make or buy, which de-
termine the distribution of economic activity, as between firms and 
markets, and the internal organization (including both the shape and 
the aggregate size) of the firm are not explained, except perhaps in tri-
vial ways, in these terms. Inasmuch as these are core issues, a theory of 
the modern corporation that does not address them is, at best, serious-
ly incomplete. 
Id. 
 75 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 37, at 74–75.  
 76 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010). 
 77 See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977) (examining the way in which management 
of US companies has become increasingly systematic). 
 78 CHANDLER, supra note 9, at 309–10;  see also Williamson, Modern Corporation, su-
pra note 8, at 1565 (“The efficiency incentive to shift from the earlier U-form to the 
M-form structure is partly explained in managerial discretion terms: the older struc-
ture was more subject to distortions of a managerial discretion kind—which is to say 
that opportunism had become a serious problem in the large U-form firm.”).  But see 
ROBERT F. FREELAND, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE MODERN CORPORATION: 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AT GENERAL MOTORS, 1924–1970, at 305 (Mark Granovetter 
ed., 2001) (“The GM case suggests that the textbook M-form is most appropriate as a 
mechanism for owner control when the division of labor among owners, top execu-
tives, and line managers is moderate but not extensive.”).  
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of transaction costs or agency costs that Berle and Means identified.
79
  
Most of the legal literature addresses this category of agency costs, 
along with the various mechanisms for mitigating these costs.
80
  In-
house counsel function as an additional mechanism (i.e., innkee-
pers) to mitigate transaction costs, especially those created by oppor-
tunism.
81
 
2. Growth of the Legal Department Function 
Just as greater divisionalization in the modern corporation can 
be explained via transaction-cost economizing, the growth of in-
house legal departments can be viewed from a similar standpoint.
82
  
With respect to legal and other types of services, corporations often 
face a make-versus-buy decision.
83
  Unlike divisional business units, 
legal departments are not profit centers.  They are cost centers and 
operate as a corporate function, providing support to business units, 
like marketing, human resources, information technology (IT), envi-
ronmental health and safety (EHS), finance and accounting, research 
and development (R&D), and government relations.
84
  Therefore, in-
ternal legal departments must continually find ways to articulate their 
value to the business enterprise and justify legal expenditures.
85
  Gen-
 
 79 See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 29 (arguing that shareholders who own 
the company do not actually control it). 
 80 See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichot-
omy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 37 (2006) (asserting that often both public 
and private firms face the same agency problems); Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond Agency 
Costs: Managing the Corporation for the Long Term, 45 RUTGERS L.J. 513, 517 (1993) (“It is 
time to reexamine the ‘managerialism’ decried by Berle and Means and their mod-
ern-day counterparts.  The preoccupation with agency costs has essentially blinded 
corporate scholars to these long-term costs to innovation and productivity.”); Ronald 
J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, 
and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 231 (2008) (discussing the dif-
ference in agency costs between public and private ownership).  
 81 See discussion infra Part V.A; see also infra app. fig.2. 
 82 Cf. Williamson, Modern Corporation, supra note 8, at 1565 (“The upshot is that a 
transaction-cost approach to the study of the modern corporation permits a wide va-
riety of significant organizational events to be interpreted in a coherent way.”). 
 83 See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 2, at 291 (“Availability, current workload, and 
specialized legal knowledge not found within the department are all important to 
the decision to engage outside counsel.  The need for quick turnaround is another 
major factor.”); Williamson, Vertical, supra note 8, at 113–14.  
 84 See PORTER, supra note 17, at 38–43. 
 85 See Albert L. Vreeland, II & Jennifer L. Howard, The Care and Feeding of In-House 
Counsel, 67 ALA. LAW. 340, 344 (2006) (“Some companies . . . view legal budgets as 
nothing more than a drain on profits, and most in-house counsel are under constant 
pressure to contain and even reduce the company’s legal expenses.”).  
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erally, corporations opt for a combination of internal and external 
legal services.  The ratio between internal and external services often 
varies with the context.  Recent trends illustrate that generally a 
greater portion of legal services are being performed internally; how-
ever, these trends are not sustainable, and leveraging external re-
sources is already regaining popularity.
86
  Despite these trends, the 
emergence of in-house counsel is a function of power not necessarily 
numbers.  Surprisingly, the legal literature has only recently at-
tempted to explain why in-house lawyers are increasing in power and 
“taking over.”
87
  A large piece of the answer lies with the strategic in-
house counsel role that generates benefits for internal and external 
corporate constituencies.
88
 
From a business perspective, there are distinct disadvantages and 
costs associated with procuring outside legal services in the market.  
Oliver Williamson asserts that the internal organization of procure-
ment services as a market substitute yields significant advantages, 
which fall into three categories: (i) incentives, (ii) controls, and (iii) 
structural advantages.
89
  Many external procurement problems stem 
from information asymmetries between the client corporation and 
the outside legal provider.
90
  Legal services often exhibit credence 
 
 86 See Baker & Parkin, supra note 7, at 1654 (“Armed with more talent and the 
goal of cutting costs, corporate law departments are performing an increasing share 
of legal work in-house.”); Stock, supra note 8, at 1 (“In-house legal departments were 
the fastest-growing ‘legal services sector’ around the world over the last five years.  In 
some markets, the growth reflects a compound increase of 15% per year.”).  Howev-
er, Thomas Sager, General Counsel, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, in 
commenting on a draft of this article, noted  that the use of external resources is re-
gaining popularity and leveraging internal resources may not be sustainable.  The 
“DuPont Legal Model” that he pioneered was designed to address this issue. 
 87 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 486–88 (addressing this phenomenon exclu-
sively from the perspective of transactional lawyering and from the vantage point of 
internal constituencies); see also Gilson, supra note 23 and accompanying text.  The 
increase can also be seen in other key areas such as compliance counseling.  See Ri-
chard S. Gruner, General Counsel in an Era of Compliance Programs and Corporate Self-
Policing, 46 EMORY L.J. 1113, 1113–14 (1997) (“The activities of general counsel in 
corporate organizations are changing in response to increasing demands for corpo-
rate law compliance and expanding knowledge about how to effectively manage law 
compliance in organizational settings.”). 
 88 See Gilson, supra note 5, at 901–03; Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of 
Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15, 15 (1995) (“‘What do business lawyers really do?’  With this 
question, Professor Ronald Gilson opened his seminal discussion of the role business 
lawyers play in ‘creating value.’” (quoting Gilson, supra note 23, at 241)).  
 89 See Williamson, Vertical, supra note 8, at 113–14. 
 90 Gilson, supra note 5, at 889 (“The most distinctive characteristic of the demand 
side of the market for legal services is pervasive information asymmetry concerning 
product quality . . . .”).  
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characteristics, thereby making the client corporation more vulnera-
ble to the opportunistic behavior of law firms seeking to extract high-
er profits.
91
  In other words, the corporate client, without some de-
gree of internal expertise, is not a sophisticated purchaser of legal 
services. 
Another drawback to using outside legal services stems from 
high switching costs created when a corporate client becomes overly 
reliant on a single law firm.
92
  High switching costs provide law firms 
with significant bargaining power.
93
  Accordingly, the corporate client 
may have to endure a lack of responsiveness and inferior service from 
the outside firm.  In response to these issues, corporations have in-
vested in an internal legal function to both perform and procure le-
gal services in the marketplace where necessary.
94
  The aforemen-
tioned factors have led to the re-allocation of bargaining power 
between the corporate client and the outside law firm.
95
  But not all 
legal observers agree on the reasons for the emergence of in-house 
counsel.  John Coffee, although acknowledging economic forces driv-
ing the changing dynamics of legal services, suggests the quest for 
power is another explanation for the shift to in-house counsel: 
The participant in this drama who gained the most from this tran-
sition was the in-house general counsel, who now became as much 
a general manager of legal services as an actual counselor to man-
agement.  For his or her own self-interested reasons, the general 
counsel typically did not want competition from outside counsel.  
 
 91 See discussion infra Part III.C.2. 
 92 Gilson, supra note 5, at 900 (“[A] pattern of practice developed that led to 
long-term lawyer-client relationships and full-service law firms.  The result was that 
switching lawyers was costly to a client.”); see also Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel 
Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 508–
09 (1989) (“The delivery of legal services requires and creates client-specific assets.  
When these assets are developed by an outside counsel, the corporation can capture 
them by rehiring the lawyer or firm.”).   
 93 See Rosen, supra note 92, at 509 (asserting that a corporation can improve its 
bargaining power by developing an in-house legal department). 
 94 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 2, at 277–78 (“[T]he decision whether to retain 
outside counsel or handle the issue inside—the ‘make or buy’ decision—is made by 
the general counsel.”).   
 95 Gilson, supra note 5, at 902–03. 
Increasingly, general counsel . . . are capable of internalizing both the 
diagnostic and referral functions they previously performed on behalf 
of clients as outside counsel. . . . [I]nternalizing these functions elimi-
nates the information asymmetry between the client and lawyer. . . . 
The consequence is a dramatic reduction in the switching costs facing 
clients and an elimination of lawyers’ market power. 
Id.   
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He or she wanted to be the primary conduit of legal advice to 
management and hence sought to discourage any long-term, con-
tinuing relationship between senior management and outside 
counsel.  As much from this reason as to encourage price compe-
tition, the in-house counsel moved legal business around, thereby 
assuring his or her own monopolistic position as the supplier of 
legal advice to senior management.  What shifted then was not 
the relative number of insider versus outside counsel, but the bal-
ance of power between them.
96
 
B. The Shifting Legal Landscape 
As corporations grew globally, in size and complexity, the poten-
tial for fraud, ethical lapses, and legal scandals involving greater 
numbers of corporate constituents also increased.  This state of affairs 
prompted an exponential expansion of regulations and laws that im-
pacted business enterprise and inevitably enhanced the need for in-
ternal legal capabilities to manage these risks.
97
  The panoply of laws 
impacting business enterprise extends well beyond the traditional 
confines of corporate law.
98
  Navigating the matrix of local, domestic, 
international, and industry-specific laws is a significant challenge even 
for companies with the greatest intentions.
99
  Against this backdrop, 
the costs associated with legal compliance significantly increased.
100
 
 
 96 COFFEE, supra note 8, at 224. 
 97 See, e.g., Catherine Aman, SOX HOP: The Nation Boogied to a New Lingo the Past 
Year as Corporate Scandals and Reform Filled the Front Pages, CORP. COUNS., Apr. 2003, at 
198; N.R. Kleinfield, When Scandal Haunts the Corridors, N. Y. TIMES, July 7, 1985, §3, at 
1; James Sterngold, Wall St. Looks Over Shoulder, N. Y. TIMES, July 14, 1986, at D1; see 
also Gruner, supra note 87, at 1113–14; Lamm, supra note 14 (addressing globaliza-
tion and the changing legal marketplace); Stock, supra note 8, § 3, at 1 (“In-house 
legal departments were the fastest-growing ‘legal services sector’ around the world 
over the last five years.  In some markets, the growth reflects a compound increase of 
15% per year.”).  
 98  See Gilson, supra note 23, at 296–97.  
A more complex transaction, like a corporate acquisition, touches a 
host of different regulatory systems, each of which can have an impor-
tant impact upon the form taken by the transaction.  Tax law, antitrust 
law, labor law, products liability law, ERISA, securities law, and corpo-
rate law do not exhaust the spectrum of regulatory oversight that may 
influence the format of a particular acquisition. 
Id.; see also CLARK, supra note 67, at § 1.4, 30–32 (distinguishing between traditional 
corporate law and other laws affecting corporations); Strine, supra note 68, at 680–81 
(distinguishing between corporate law in the traditional sense and laws affecting 
corporations tangentially). 
 99 Cf. Daly, supra note 2, at 1057–58. 
[T]wo of the most significant changes in corporate legal practice in the 
United States over the past thirty years [are]: the growth in number, 
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1. Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Heightened Criminal 
Penalties, Amnesty and Whistleblower Programs 
Generally, up to the 1990s, the costs of criminal convictions to 
companies were limited because corporations “were subject to the 
same penalties as individual defendants.”
101
  The federal criminal law 
did not provide incentives for companies to adopt compliance pro-
grams but instead provided disincentives.  Because corporations were 
strictly vicariously liable for crimes committed by employees within 
the scope of their employment, corporations were reluctant to adopt 
compliance programs that created a flow of information to manage-
ment and could potentially uncover detrimental evidence.
102
  Making 
matters worse, the adoption of compliance programs did not result in 
amnesty or reduced sanctions.
103
 
 
prestige, and power of in-house counsel and the globalization of the 
business and capital markets.  Operating synergistically, these changes 
are creating distinctive cultural, ethical, and legal challenges for the 
general counsel of global organizations. 
Id.; Janet Stidman Eveleth, Life as Corporate Counsel, MD. B.J., Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 20 
(“Many corporations are turning to in-house corporate attorneys for guidance and 
are finding their internal legal departments invaluable as they address the new fed-
eral Sarbanes Oxley Act, and its multitude of new rules . . . .”).  
 100 See, e.g., Tamara Loomis, Cost of Compliance Soars After Sarbanes-Oxley, N.Y. L.J., 
May 1, 2003, at 1 (“[T]he average price of being public has close to doubled . . . .”).  
 101 Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 833, 838 (1994).  There are, however, some exceptions such as the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff (2006). 
 102 Arlen, supra note 101, at 836. 
This regime of strict vicarious liability presents corporations contem-
plating enforcement expenditures with conflicting, potentially per-
verse, incentives. On the one hand, increased enforcement expendi-
tures reduce the number of agents who commit crimes by increasing 
the probability of detection and thus each agent’s expected cost of 
crime. On the other hand, these expenditures also increase the proba-
bility that the government will detect those crimes that are committed, 
thereby increasing the corporation’s expected criminal liability for 
those crimes. 
Id.  As a general matter, compliance systems bring material information to manage-
ment’s attention.  Information networks are key to governance.  Compliance pro-
grams create a paper trail enhanced by technology, which may appear at odds with 
companies seeking to limit litigation risk.  See Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls 
After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate Law’s “Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems,” 
31 J. CORP. L. 949, 954–55 (2006) (explaining that certain sections of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act require corporate officers to accept responsibility for the implementation 
of internal controls which are reasonably designed to bring material information to 
their attention). 
 103 See Arlen, supra note 101, at 839–40.  
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By the mid-1990s, the federal corporate criminal law landscape 
had changed drastically.
104
  Corporations could benefit from adopting 
a compliance program because, at least in theory, it could have a di-
rect effect on reducing criminal penalties in the event of a crime and 
also serve an indirect deterrence function.
105
  In addition, the risk and 
cost of criminal violations expanded through criminal regulations 
targeting business practices such as corruption, consumer and em-
ployee safety, and environmental protection.
106
  The most notable de-
velopments included changes in the federal sentencing laws, which 
provided strong incentives for firms to adopt compliance programs.
107
  
For example, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations 
were designed to reduce the criminal fine of any convicted corpora-
tion with an effective compliance program.
108
  Thereafter, “some fed-
eral prosecutors [went] beyond the mitigation provisions of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines[,] . . . refrain[ing] altogether from prosecuting 
 
 104 Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analy-
sis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 690 (1997) (The guidelines 
changed “the traditional rule imposing strict vicarious liability on the firm for its 
agents’ wrongdoing with a ‘composite’ regime in which the firm incurs a reduced 
penalty if it has discharged certain compliance-related duties.”). 
 105 Id; Jay M. Cohen, Compliance and the Code of Conduct, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: LAW AND PRACTICE § 13.02[1] (Bart Schwartz & Amy L. Goodman eds., 
2010).  
 106 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§78m(b), (d)(1), (g)–(h), 78dd(1)–(3), 78ff (2006); Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590. 
 107 Cohen, supra note 105, at § 13.02[2][b].  “The FSGO [Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines for Organizations] . . . gave companies a very good reason to [develop 
and enforce written codes of conduct]. . . . In 1987, the Sentencing Commission is-
sued the first binding sentencing guidelines applicable to individual defendants.”  Id. 
(discussing 1991 U.S.S.G. § 8).   
 108 See id.  
The Sentencing Commission “structured its framework to create a 
model for the good ‘corporate’ citizen; use the model to make organi-
zational sentencing fair and predictable; and ultimately employ the 
model to create incentives for organizations to deter crime.”  It is be-
cause of these incentives that the impact of the FSGO on organization-
al governance and compliance activities has been so profound. 
Id. (quoting Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines (Oct. 7, 2003), at 14.)  Cf. Memorandum from The Deputy Attorney 
General to All Component Heads and United States Attorneys (June 16, 1999), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/ 
charging-corps.pdf (discussing criminal conduct by corporations and prosecution of 
the culpable individuals and the corporation on whose behalf they acted); Memo-
randum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of Department 
Components and United States Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf (noting the De-
partment of Justice’s recent success in prosecuting corporate fraud). 
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firms with good compliance programs, reporting, and post-offense 
reforms.”
109
  The Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, par-
ticularly with their seven key criteria to address a wide array of legal 
compliance issues (e.g., environmental, antitrust, export controls, 
discrimination, and government contracting), arguably had the 
greatest impact on legal departments and the development of sophis-
ticated compliance programs.  In 2005, the United States Supreme 
Court, in United States v. Booker, ruled that the sentencing guidelines 
do not impose mandatory restrictions on courts’ sentencing deci-
sions.
110
  Notwithstanding the Booker decision, the sentencing guide-
lines remain an important advisory source for sentencing decisions. 
Additionally, the introduction of amnesty programs together 
with incentives and immunities for whistleblowers dramatically in-
creased the stakes for corporations, which now have a compelling in-
terest to identify criminal behavior.  A prime illustration is the anti-
trust arena where a corporation that is the first to report illegal cartel 
behavior to the Department of Justice (DOJ) or other enforcement 
bodies such as the European Commission may avoid criminal liability, 
reputational damage, and fines of potentially hundreds of millions of 
dollars.
111
  Under the DOJ’s antitrust leniency policies, corporations 
are also more likely to settle private follow-on civil class-action lawsuits 
more quickly and at relatively low cost.  Without leniency, such civil 
claims would normally lead to treble damages.
112
  Within this context, 
the presence of in-house counsel, who are able to detect even indi-
rect indicators of anticompetitive behavior, gives a corporation a 
marked advantage over other entities that lack this capability. 
2. Caremark and its Progeny 
In the 1996 Caremark decision, the Delaware Court of Chancery, 
partly influenced by changes in federal sentencing laws concerning 
compliance programs, recognized a director’s duty to monitor that 
 
 109 Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 104, at 690.   
 110 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 111 Tailoring Compliance Programs to Address the Antitrust Division’s Tools for Expanding 
Cartel Investigations, WILMER HALE (June 3, 2009), 
http://www.wilmerhale.com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication=9161.  
Complete amnesty or leniency is contingent upon being first to report violations of 
anti-trust law.  Id.  
 112 Id.  To qualify for leniency in the civil context, a corporation must fulfill sever-
al criteria such as furnishing documents, making personnel available for interviews, 
and responding truthfully and completely.  Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement 
and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 213, 118 Stat. 665, 668.  
SIMMONS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2011  12:24 PM 
2011] INNKEEPERS: A UNIFYING THEORY 103 
 
included the implementation of internal compliance controls.
113
  Al-
though Chancellor Allen’s dictum made clear that compliance sys-
tems were the responsibility of directors in modern corporations, it 
also set a high bar for plaintiffs because director liability was limited 
to knowing violations and not inadvertent neglect.
114
  In 2006, the De-
laware Supreme Court affirmed the Caremark decision and clarified 
the scope of director oversight duties: 
We hold that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predi-
cate for director oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly failed 
to implement any reporting or information system or controls; or 
(b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously 
failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling them-
selves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their 
attention.  In either case, imposition of liability requires a show-
ing that the directors knew that they were not discharging their 
fiduciary obligations.  Where directors fail to act in the face of a 
known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard 
for their responsibilities, they breach their duty of loyalty by fail-
ing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good faith.
115
 
Whereas the Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines created a 
de facto requirement for compliance programs, Caremark clearly made 
legal compliance a traditional corporate law issue.  Yet within the cur-
rent legal framework, companies still have considerable discretion in 
designing compliance programs.
116
 
 
 113 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(“[A] director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a 
corporate information and reporting system . . . exists, and that failure to do . . . may 
. . . render a director liable for losses incurred by non-compliance with applicable 
legal standards.”).  
 114 Id. at 971.  The Court said in Caremark: 
Generally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss is pre-
dicated upon ignorance of liability creating activities within the corpo-
ration . . . only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise 
oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable in-
formation and reporting system exists—will establish the lack of good 
faith that is a necessary condition to liability. 
Id. 
 115 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).  In 2009, the Delaware Supreme 
Court in Gantler v. Stevens extended liability for breaches of fiduciary duty to non-
director corporate officers such as CFO’s and general counsels.  See Gantler v. Ste-
vens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009); see also Johnson & Garvis, supra note 12, at 
1106–09 (discussing the fiduciary duties of non-director officers). 
 116 See Langevoort, supra note 102, at 953 (explaining that the threat of liability “is 
restrained enough to leave ample room for business judgment on the specifics of 
compliance design”).   
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3. Sarbanes-Oxley and the Compliance Industry 
Against the backdrop of scandals involving companies such as 
Enron and Tyco emerged the historic Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX 
Act”).
117
  The SOX Act formalized auditing requirements within pub-
licly traded corporations.  Although legal scholars harbor divergent 
views on the value of the SOX Act reforms,
118
 the advent of the SOX 
Act without question led to an enhanced focus on internal controls 
and legal compliance.
119
  More skeptical observers contend that the 
SOX Act also led to the expansion of the compliance industry and 
burdened corporations with unnecessary costs rather than tangible 
improvements in corporate practices.
120
  But all perspectives regard-
 
 117 See, e.g., Chad Bray, Court Upholds Convictions of Former Tyco Executives, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 17, 2008, at B3; John Harwood, Public’s Esteem for Business Falls in Wake of Enron 
Scandal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2002, at D5; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.   
 118 Compare David D. Aufhauser, Overall, Sarbanes-Oxley Is Good for U.S. Competitive-
ness, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 433, 435–37 (2008) (arguing that Sarbanes-Oxley has 
many positive aspects), with Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: 
Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 977–78 
(2003) (arguing that, on the merits, the SOX Act deserves “a B-, respectable, but 
surprisingly low given the attention showered on it by the press, law firms, executive 
suites, investor groups, and the public. . . . It is impossible to prove that the enact-
ments would or would not deter or prevent the repetition of the scandals they are 
designed to deter or prevent.”); compare Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construc-
tion of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1817, 1820 (2007) (concluding that 
“[t]here is no clear-cut answer to the question of how much SOX benefits inves-
tors”), with Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521, 1527–28 (2005) (finding that SOX “will not provide 
much in the way of benefit to investors”).  
 119 See, e.g., Carole Basri et al., From a Corporate Governance and Compliance Viewpoint: 
A Practical Guide to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, in CORPORATE LEGAL DEPARTMENTS 
2003, at 11–45 (2003) (“Many provisions of [Sarbanes-Oxley] are aimed at corporate 
governance and corporate compliance conduct.  These areas include the responsibil-
ity of the board of directors and its audit committee in connection with accounting 
regularities, conflicts of interest, whistle blowing complaints, insider trading and 
‘oversight responsibility’ for corporate compliance programs.”); Sarah Helene Dug-
gin, The McNulty Memorandum, the KPMG Decision and Corporate Cooperation: Individual 
Rights and Legal Ethics, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 341, 394 (2008) (“[T]he deference 
accorded to compliance advice from corporate counsel has undoubtedly increased in 
the post-Sarbanes-Oxley world . . . .” ); see also Symposium, Corporate Compliance: The 
Role of Company Counsel, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 491, 525–34 (2008) (remarks of Ro-
bert Lupone, Carol Rakatansky, & Sung Hui Kim).  
 120 See William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of 
“Going Private,” 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 141 (2005) (asserting that the costs of complying 
with Sarbanes-Oxley exceed the benefits of going public for many corporations, par-
ticularly those of modest size); Thomas E. Hartman, Five Years After Sarbanes-Oxley, the 
Compliance Costs Remain Huge, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, at 37.  But see J. Bonasia, 
Sarbanes-Oxley Law Offers Side Benefits, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Oct. 5, 2005, at A6 (ex-
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ing the SOX Act, whether skeptical, favorable, or agnostic, implicate 
the need for greater internal expertise and the legal acumen of in-
house counsel to control costs and manage legal threats. 
Delaware jurisprudence, federal laws impacting corporate liabili-
ty, and recent corporate scandals have all raised the profile of direc-
tor oversight of corporate legal compliance.  These developments 
contributed to the growth of the compliance industry and competi-
tion among outside service providers for lucrative corporate com-
pliance business engagements.
121
  In addition, these developments 
coincided with business efforts to integrate legal compliance under 
the broader strategy umbrella of Enterprise Risk Management 
(ERM).
122
  Generally, ERM is an enterprise-wide attempt to ensure 
that corporations address risks in the business process.
123
  It often in-
volves the analysis and identification of risks as well as managing 
those risks via internal controls.
124
  Legal risks, however, are just one 
species of risks that should be incorporated into business decisions.
125
  
Legal compliance risks engender a strong operational connection to 
corporate transactions and activity.  Unsurprisingly, the implementa-
tion of corporate compliance and certain risk-mitigation measures of-
 
plaining that “some companies and groups have found that the law can make their 
business more effective” possibly because “North American investors say they’re will-
ing to pay a 13% premium for stocks that assure good governance”); Amy Borrus, 
Learning to Love Sarbanes-Oxley: A Few Companies Have Discovered that Compliance Actually 
Helps to Cut Costs, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 21, 2005, at 126, 128 (“A few companies are 
discovering, to their surprise, that taking stock of internal controls can help beyond 
just unmasking accounting problems.  By forcing executives to dig deep into how 
their companies get work done, Section 404 [of Sarbanes-Oxley] is enabling business 
to cut costs and boost productivity.”). 
 121 See generally Rebecca Walker, The Evolution of the Law of Corporate Compliance in 
the United States: A Brief Overview, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS INSTITUTE 
2009, at 15 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 18176, 2009) 
(explaining how Sarbanes-Oxley, among other pieces of legislation and administra-
tive action, has resulted in more sophisticated compliance programs, increased gov-
ernment expectations regarding the effectiveness of these compliance programs, and 
the promotion of an ethical corporate culture.).   
 122 See generally Matteo Tonello, Emerging Governance Practices in Enterprise Risk Man-
agement (The Conference Board, Research Report No. R-1398-07-WG, 2007). 
 123 See generally, Stephen Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. 
CORP. L. 967 (2009). 
 124 See Carolyn Kay Brancatto et al., The Role of U.S. Corporate Boards in Enterprise 
Risk Management 10 (The Conference Board, Research Report No. R-1390-06-RR, 
2006).  
 125 Other types of risk include financial risk, reputational risk, human resource 
risks, operational risks, and brand equity risks.  See id. at 11 fig.1. 
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ten occur under the direction of, or require significant involvement 
from, in-house counsel.
126
 
C. The Nature of Legal Services 
1. Fungibility of Legal Services 
Legal services are more fungible than outside legal service pro-
viders may care to admit.
127
  The reputational and expertise gaps be-
tween in-house and outside lawyers are becoming smaller and, in cer-
tain areas, nonexistent.
128
  In addition, corporations are becoming 
more savvy and sophisticated purchasers of legal services.
129
  Within 
this context, corporations are seeking value added beyond law firm 
reputation.  Corporations and in-house legal departments often pos-
sess a more instrumental demand-side view of legal services and do 
 
 126 See Duggin, supra note 13, at 1012 (“[G]eneral counsel and other in-house law-
yers play a major role in ensuring legal compliance throughout the entity.  The ‘con-
ception of the lawyer as a promoter of corporate compliance with law emanates from 
the basic values of the legal profession,’ and is a vital responsibility of contemporary 
general counsel.” (quoting A.B.A., REPORT OF AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE 
ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (Mar. 31, 2003), 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/final_report.pdf)). 
 127 See Baker & Parkin, supra note 7, at 1655.  
Because corporate clients now do much of their routine legal work in-
house, they are more likely to hire outside firms only for large, com-
plex, or specialized matters. . . . “Increasingly, clients view their legal 
counsel as a commodity that can be purchased from a number of 
sources” and often “shop” their work through a competitive selection 
process to a broader set of firms.  
Id. (quoting John S. Lipsey, Shift in Focus: Keeping Clients Happy, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 29, 
2001, at B20); see also Andrew Bruck & Andrew Canter, Note, Supply, Demand, and the 
Changing Economics of Large Law Firms, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2087, 2110–11 (2008) (discuss-
ing the “growing body of routine, fungible legal work [that] can be handled . . . by a 
smaller firm that charges lower rates”).  Although occasional “high stakes” cases re-
main for companies who are “willing to pay exceptional prices to ensure success,” 
many companies now employ a competitive bidding process to select providers of 
outside legal work.  Id. 
 128 See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 92, at 479 (“Once castigated, inside counsel report-
edly now are accorded not only ‘admiration and respect’ by their corporate employ-
ers but also ‘growing prestige’ within the bar.”); see also Heineman, supra note 51. 
 129 See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Law Firms, Competition Penalties, and the Values of Profes-
sionalism, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 30 (1999). 
[A]s legal services have become a more significant component of its 
budget, the corporation has begun to internalize more of the provision 
of legal services by greatly expanding the size and role of its in-house 
legal department. . . . [In-house counsel] can serve as sophisticated 
consumers of outside legal services, reducing the asymmetry of infor-
mation between the corporation and law firm attorneys. 
Id. 
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not differentiate between legal services and other procured services. 
Depending on the type of legal work involved, multiple firms may 
adequately perform the task.
130
  Other components of value, such as 
responsiveness and cost, can make a less reputable firm more attrac-
tive to the client corporation.
131
  Thus, a five-star law firm may not be 
necessary where a three-star firm will suffice. 
2. Credence Services 
Legal services resemble credence services.
132
  Credence services, 
which were first identified by Michael Darby and Edi Karni,
133
 are ser-
vices whose quality cannot fully be determined even after the search 
process and consumption (e.g., certain medical services, automobile 
repairs, and education).
134
  Credence services have “high pre-buying 
costs and high post-buying costs of quality detection.”
135
  They exhibit 
an asymmetry between buyers and sellers concerning the acquisition 
of knowledge regarding service value.
136
  In the credence service con-
text, assessments of value will either be impossible to determine or 
 
 130 See Baker & Parkin, supra note 7, at 1652 (discussing “the decline in relation-
ship lawyering” and the rising fungibility of legal services).  But see Schwarcz, supra 
note 7, at 498 (discussing how certain types of legal work are less likely to be consi-
dered a fungible commodity and more likely the bailiwick of outside law firms). 
 131 See, e.g., James P. Schratz, I Told You to Fire Nicholas Farber: A Psychological and 
Sociological Analysis of Why Attorneys Overbill, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2211, 2221 (1998) 
(“When any particular industry develops to the stage where the client considers the 
supplier of services to be offering a fungible commodity, purchasing decisions will be 
based primarily on costs at the expense of the supplier.”). 
 132 See Victor Fleisher, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Struc-
tures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1600 (2006) (listing the three types of goods: (i) search 
goods, (ii) experience goods, and (iii) credence goods).  The quality of search 
goods, such as clothing, footwear, and jewelry, can readily be discerned during the 
search process prior to consumption.  See id.  Search goods have “low pre-buying 
costs of quality detection.”  MEN-ANDRI BENZ, STRATEGIES IN MARKETS FOR EXPERIENCE 
AND CREDENCE GOODS 2 (2007); see also Philip Nelson, Information and Consumer Beha-
vior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311, 311 (1970) (analyzing consumer behavior with respect to 
search and experience goods).  On the other hand, the quality of experience goods 
is not discerned during the search process, but rather after consumption.  See Mi-
chael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & 
ECON. 67, 68 (1973).  Experience goods have “high pre-buying costs of quality detec-
tion,” but low post-buying costs.  BENZ, supra.  Examples of experience goods include 
jobs, movies, newspapers, wine, and food.  Id. 
 133 See Darby & Karni, supra note 132, at 68–69 (“Credence qualities are those 
which, although worthwhile, cannot be evaluated in normal use.”). 
 134 See BENZ, supra note 132, at 2. 
 135 Id.   
 136 Id.   
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require costly information and other proper circumstances.
137
  The 
other proper circumstances in this context apply to situations where 
the lapse of a considerable period of time may reveal the value of the 
service.
138
 
There are two types of asymmetry implicated by credence cha-
racteristics.
139
  The first type involves the customer’s inability to know 
her needs or diagnose her problem.
140
  The second type involves the 
customer’s inability to determine the level of service necessary.
141
  The 
interplay between diagnosis and service provision exacerbates the 
customer’s dilemma because “consumer ignorance and [the] addi-
tional cost of separate diagnosis and repair provide motivation for a 
service firm to defraud its customers.”
142
  Oliver Williamson describes 
a similar issue of veracity risk whereby “information may be filtered 
and possibly distorted to the advantage of the [service] firm that has 
assumed the information collection responsibility.”
143
 
Consider the following example concerning the provision of le-
gal services.  An outside lawyer communicates to her corporate client 
that in order to comply with certain regulations the client must do X, 
Y, and Z.  Would action X alone suffice and eliminate the threat of 
noncompliance?  Because legal services involve questions of judg-
ment against a backdrop of uncertainty, the client must depend on 
the outside lawyer’s judgment not only to provide services but to de-
termine the adequate level of service.  In the above scenario, actions 
X, Y, and Z are inevitably more costly than action X alone.
144
  Cre-
 
 137 Darby & Karni, supra note 132, at 68–69. 
 138 See id. 
 139 See Brian Roe & Ian Sheldon, Credence Good Labeling: The Efficiency and Distribu-
tional Implications of Several Policy Approaches, 89 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1020, 1020 n.1 
(2007). 
 140 See id. (“[O]nly an expert can diagnose the consumer’s true needs, e.g., does 
the car need a minor or major repair?”). 
 141 See id. (“[O]nly the seller may know the level of service actually provided, e.g., 
was the car given the appropriate level of service?”). 
 142 Darby & Karni, supra note 132, at 77. 
 143 Williamson, Vertical, supra note 8, at 120. 
 144 Cf. Gilson, supra note 5, at 902–03. 
As Robert Mnookin and I stated four years ago, “[g]eneral counsel for 
major corporations are creating a revolution and are the primary 
agents of change.”  Increasingly, general counsel are former partners 
in large corporate firms who are capable of internalizing both the di-
agnostic and referral functions they previously performed on behalf of 
clients as outside counsel.  The critical difference is that internalizing 
these functions eliminates the information asymmetry between client 
and lawyer, so that no relationship specific assets are created and no 
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dence characteristics enhance the likelihood of law firm opportunism 
because of information asymmetries caused by the coupling of diag-
nostic and service functions within an outside law firm. 
On the other hand, in-house counsel, and more specifically gen-
eral counsel, function as sophisticated purchasers by performing as-
pects of the diagnostic and service functions.
145
  In this context, in-
house counsel take some degree of market power and perverse incen-
tives away from outside law firms because outside law firms are no 
longer needed to exclusively diagnose a legal problem.
146
  With inter-
nalization, the client corporation has a greater awareness of the qual-
ity of service that outside law firms perform.  The effective internali-
zation of the diagnostic legal function requires that, under most 
circumstances, in-house counsel serve as the primary client contact 
 
lock-in effect results. The consequence is a dramatic reduction in the 
switching costs facing clients and an elimination of lawyer’s market 
power. 
Id. (quoting Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capi-
talists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 313, 381 (1985)). 
 145 See id. at 914 (“A talented general counsel can internalize the diagnostic and 
referral functions that previously had contributed to creating switching costs.  Re-
duced costs of changing lawyers made private gatekeeping an increasingly difficult 
proposition.”). 
 146 Gilson, supra note 23, at 292 n.143. 
The importance of the lawyer’s reputation in shaping the character of 
the expected opinion can be clearly seen in the familiar debate over 
from whom the buyer will accept an opinion on behalf of the seller.  
For example, buyers will frequently object to receiving the opinion of 
the seller’s in-house counsel with respect to certain items.  Identifying 
the matters for which the buyer will or will not accept the opinion of 
the seller’s in-house counsel is a good way to distinguish those aspects 
of the opinion of counsel that serve primarily an information-
production function from those that serve primarily a verification func-
tion.  In-house counsel will often have a cost advantage with respect to 
the information-production function because of their more intimate 
knowledge of their client.  With respect to the verification function, 
however, the ability to serve as a reputational intermediary requires a 
sufficient diversity of clients such that a penalty will be imposed in fu-
ture dealings if the intermediary cheats.  As a result, opinions that serve 
a verification function are largely limited to outside counsel, while 
those that serve an information-production function are often accepted 
from in-house counsel. 
Id.  (internal citations omitted); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Fore-
word: Business Lawyers and Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 4 n.14 (1995) 
(discussing the reduction in the information asymmetry between lawyers and clients 
and the concomitant reduction in outside lawyer market power). 
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for outside counsel.
147
  Although legal observers rightfully indicate 
that incentives for outside lawyer opportunism decrease as a result of 
increased competition among outside law firms and reputational 
costs, this assertion is qualified by the presence of credence 
attributes.
148
 
IV. A UNIFYING THEORY OF THE IN-HOUSE COUNSEL ROLE 
Our theory posits that the strategic in-house counsel role, em-
bodying consistent interaction with corporate operations and actors 
(e.g., management and employees), enables the modern corporation 
to significantly enhance its creation of value.
149
  Although the discus-
sion of how business lawyers create value is not new, our theory is 
more holistic and less static than the available theories or definitions 
provided by legal observers.
150
  These available definitions, although 
useful, are descriptively too narrow because they (i) are limited to 
transactional sources of value; (ii) are fragmented; or (iii) fail to cap-
ture the unique value that stems from in-house counsel linkages, net-
works, and integration with other firm activities.  By contrast, our 
theory is not limited to transactions as traditionally envisioned, but 
also encompasses intangible and non-transactional sources of value, 
such as corporate compliance, which help directors and officers fulfill 
their oversight duties.
151
  Ignoring these additional sources of value, as 
 
 147 Directors may, however, retain their own counsel regarding certain issues.  
Compare Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Edward B. Rock, A New Player in the Boardroom: The 
Emergence of the Independent Directors’ Counsel, 59 BUS. LAW. 1389, 1410–12 (2004) (pre-
dicting more frequent and general use of outside special counsel to the independent 
directors), with Veasey, supra note 13, at 1418 (disagreeing with that premise and not-
ing that special counsel to the independent directors should be on a special-need 
basis and the board should trust and rely on general counsel otherwise).  Corpora-
tions may also employ separate law firms to provide audit and routine counseling in 
order to limit the prospect of outside law firm opportunism and biased advice.  A law 
firm performing an audit of business activity made pursuant to their prior routine 
legal advice raises potential conflicts.   
 148 Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 525 (“The central imperfection identified by [trans-
action cost economic] theory is ex post opportunistic behavior —meaning, in this 
Article’s context, that outside counsel may try to take advantage of the client after 
being retained but before the transaction closes.”).  
 149 See infra app. fig.1. 
 150 According to Ronald Gilson, the standard by which business lawyers are eva-
luated is simply:  “If what a business lawyer does has value, a transaction must be worth 
more, net of legal fees, as a result of the lawyer’s participation.”  Gilson, supra note 23 (em-
phasis in original). 
 151 See George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 BUS. LAW. 
279, 294 (2009) (“Much work of business lawyers does not entail ‘transactions.’  
Business lawyers advise corporate boards and officers in satisfying their fiduciary and 
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well as the unique value generated by in-house counsel integration 
and linkages, negatively distorts the impact of in-house counsel on 
corporate affairs.
152
 
In order to proffer a more robust descriptive assessment of the 
in-house counsel function, it is helpful to address three important 
questions concerning in-house counsel value creation: (i) What are 
the unique attributes of the in-house counsel role? (ii) How do in-
house counsel create value? and (iii) Who are the external and inter-
nal beneficiaries of this value?  The ensuing analysis of these three 
basic questions renders a more comprehensive analysis of in-house 
counsel efficacy. 
A. What are the Unique Attributes of the In-House Counsel Role? 
Although in-house counsel and outside counsel both provide 
valuable legal services, there are notable differences in the respective 
roles that reveal the uniqueness of in-house counsel, namely, a single 
but multifaceted client, the non-discrete in-house counsel role, and a 
seat at the table (i.e., a strategic integrated function).
153
 
1. The Single but Multifaceted Client 
The principal distinction between in-house counsel and external 
legal counsel is that in-house counsel serve a single but multifaceted 
 
other legal duties.  They oversee the firm’s compliance with regulations and con-
tracts. This work demands skills different from those needed in transactions.”).  At 
times, transactional and compliance sources of value creation may seem difficult to 
reconcile.  See Baer, supra note 11, at 566.  In the transactional mode, in-house coun-
sel operate as “transaction costs engineers;” Ronald Gilson and others have hig-
hlighted this source of value creation.  See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 146, at 7–8; 
Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 499 (examining “the shift from outside to in-house ‘trans-
actional lawyering’—meaning the structuring, negotiating, contract drafting, advi-
sory, and opinion-giving process leading to ‘closing’ a commercial, financing, or oth-
er business transaction”).  Here, in-house counsel are more likely to be viewed as 
team members and facilitators.  Yet, in the latter compliance mode, in-house counsel 
often adopt a more cautious monitoring, implementation, and policing function.  
Operating within the compliance mode, business people are more likely to view in-
house counsel as inhibitors and impediments to business transactions.  See Kim, supra 
note 11, at 441 (“Sobering accounts of inside lawyers who sued their employers un-
der a claim of retaliatory discharge reveal that some inside lawyers are ostensibly 
fired for not being ‘team players.’”).  
 152 Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 499 (“This Article does not address such non-
transactional lawyering roles as litigation, lobbying, or compliance work because 
those roles do not normally involve, as does transactional lawyering, head-to-head 
competition between outside and in-house counsel.”).   
 153 Id. at 500 (“The recipient of value provided by in-house and outside lawyers is 
always primarily the client-company.”). 
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client.
154
  Ultimately, the corporation is the client, but its interests 
may, at times, conflict with senior executives, employees, and other 
corporate constituencies.
155
 
2. The Non-Discrete Role of In-House Counsel 
Another distinction is the non-discrete role of in-house counsel.  
In essence, in-house counsel are the “Swiss Army Knife” of the legal 
profession and perform a fusion of roles, often assuming organiza-
tional responsibilities well beyond those of their external counter-
parts.
156
  For example, in-house counsel may serve as officers, direc-
tors, committee members, or lobbyists and may have significant 
compliance responsibilities that are non-legal.
157
  The mixture of legal 
and business roles requires a broader set of skills particularly among 
general counsel, who must not only manage legal departments, but 
often navigate and influence corporate culture to limit legal risk and 
costs.
158
 
 
 154 See, e.g., Sally R. Weaver, Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel: A Structural and 
Contextual Analysis, 46 EMORY L.J. 1023, 1027 (1997) (“The first, and perhaps most 
critical, difference between corporate counsel and their colleagues in private prac-
tice is the economic dependence of corporate counsel on a single client.”). 
 155 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2007); Veasey & Di Gug-
lielmo, supra note 39, at 8–13 (explaining that tensions may arise because of in-house 
counsel’s relationship with corporate management and in spite of these tensions in-
house counsel “must exercise independent judgment on behalf of the corporate 
client when advising directors, officers, and employees of the client.”); Weaver, supra 
note 154, at 1028 (“[T]he close working relationship between management and cor-
porate counsel may create confusion and uncertainty about the role of corporate 
counsel in the representation of the organization.”). 
 156 See Duggin, supra note 13, at 1003–16 (explaining that some of the “formal” 
functions of in-house counsel “[encompass] managerial duties and non-legal busi-
ness related responsibilities,” which include acting as manager of outside legal ser-
vices, serving as a corporate officer, management committee member, and/or a di-
rector, and acting as a strategic planner).  Duggin goes on to state that “in additional 
to fulfilling their formal or official duties, [general counsel] frequently play a variety 
of informal roles that have a less visible but sometimes even more powerful impact 
on client corporations.”  Id. at 1016–17.  These informal roles include legal services 
marketer, ethics counselor, crisis manager, and arbitrator.  Id. at 1017–20.  See also 
Daly, supra note 2, at 1061 (“Clients came to expect their general counsel to be in-
volved in any big strategic issue at the heart of the organization and to know very in-
timately what’s going on in the minds of top executives.”).   
 157 See Weaver, supra note 154, at 1027 (“The second defining characteristic of the 
corporate counsel role is the tendency for the corporate counsel to assume responsi-
bilities in the organization that exceed, and differ from, those of the typical attorney-
client relationship.”). 
 158 See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 2, at 289.  General counsel usually “[assume] 
managerial responsibility for all legal work performed for the corporation.”  Id.  “Be-
cause most large legal departments must conform to the financial planning require-
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3. A Seat at the Table 
Generally, in-house counsel function in a strategic capacity whe-
reas outside counsel primarily play a tactical role.  In-house counsel 
(and particularly general counsel) often sit at the intersection of most 
corporate activity.  Moreover, in-house counsel usually have or should 
have the opportunity to be part of the management team, whether at 
the pinnacle of an organization or somewhere in the middle ranks of 
the organization.  This integrated strategic function (or seat at the 
table) affords in-house counsel (i) access to information and institu-
tional knowledge, (ii) the power to promote internal action, (iii) re-
sponsibility for outside counsel, and (iv) the capacity to engage in 
preventive law. 
a. Access to Information and Institutional Knowledge 
In-house counsel’s access to formal and informal information 
within the client corporation is a significant attribute.
159
  In-house 
counsel often acquire institutional knowledge concerning business 
operations and corporate culture that inevitably allow them to offer 
legal guidance in a more proactive ex ante manner.
160
  Oliver William-
 
ments of the corporation and predict what had heretofore been regarded as unpre-
dictable, the pressure to elaborate and use budgetary controls is growing.”  Id. at 292.  
Thus, when legal work is outsourced, “legal bills are scrutinized and almost universal-
ly must be approved by legal departments” in an effort to reduce costs.  Id.; see also 
Carl D. Liggio, Sr., A Look at the Role of Corporate Counsel: Back to the Future—or Is It the 
Past?, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 631 (2002). 
Outside counsel did not have the luxury of making the business deci-
sion that not providing Rolls Royce reliability was an acceptable risk.  
Both for the fear of malpractice and injuring an important client rela-
tionship, outside counsel would typically leave no stone unturned, no 
case unread, and no possible issue unresearched.  Corporate counsel, 
however, could (and began to) make the judgments that they could af-
ford to assume the risk of not using a Rolls Royce approach on certain 
matters. 
Id. 
 159 See Weaver, supra note 154, at 1028 (“The third characteristic that defines the 
relationship between corporate counsel and their employer-clients is the access af-
forded corporate counsel to informal sources of information because of their physi-
cal proximity to their clients.  Professor Hazard characterizes the information that 
flows from these informal sources as back-channel or ‘water cooler’ information.” 
(citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 
1011, 1018 (1997))). 
 160 See DeMott, supra note 10, at 955–56 (“A general counsel may also be uniquely 
well positioned to champion a transformation of the organizational culture that 
shapes how the corporation addresses its relationships with law and regulation.”); see 
also Chayes & Chayes, supra note 2, at 281–89 (discussing in-house counsel’s involve-
ment in corporate strategic planning and “programmatic prevention” to insure the 
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son highlights additional informational advantages that coincide with 
using internal procurement as a substitute for market services, such 
as superior access to ex post data.
161
  Equipped with this institutional 
knowledge of business context, in-house counsel develop a dual 
competency or consciousness usually absent from outside legal ser-
vice providers.
162
  Admittedly, however, there is no reason why outside 
counsel cannot acquire a similar (or some rudimentary) understand-
ing of a corporation’s businesses and structures.  But what truly dis-
tinguishes the in-house counsel role is the ability to understand the 
way things operate in a dynamic sense, for example, who needs to be 
consulted, who can be helpful, and who has significant influence 
within and outside of the management hierarchy. 
b. Power to Promote Internal Action 
In-house counsel have the power to promote actions within the 
corporation, which distinguishes them from outside counsel who lack 
executive authority.  The general counsel of a corporation is usually 
an officer, for example, a senior vice president, and that position em-
bodies certain forms of executive and financial power.  Even if out-
side counsel are heavily involved in designing a compliance system or 
a patent strategy, it is the in-house counsel who ultimately have the 
power to implement such designs.  Similarly, through “sign-off” or 
other procedures, in-house counsel have the power to block actions 
that threaten corporate value. 
c. Responsibility for Outside Legal Services 
General counsel normally have absolute control over the selec-
tion and management of outside counsel.  This even applies to spe-
cialist areas such as tax or intellectual property where there may be 
internal specialists who are quite capable of working directly with 
outside legal providers.  Although outside counsel could be asked to 
take on the role of supervising the provision of legal services on be-
half of their corporate client, this scenario is unlikely to survive in the 
long term because it will often lead to conflicts of interest and rela-
tionship issues with other outside law firms. 
 
company is in compliance with government regulations); Daly, supra note 2, at 1071 
(“[C]lients involve [in-house counsel] in strategic business planning long before any 
deals are negotiated, often before the other side to a potential transaction is even 
approached.  The proactive model is now a well established feature of in-house la-
wyering.”). 
 161 See Williamson, Vertical, supra note 8, at 113, 117, 119. 
 162 See discussion supra Part IV.A.2. 
SIMMONS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2011  12:24 PM 
2011] INNKEEPERS: A UNIFYING THEORY 115 
 
d. The Capacity to Engage in Preventive Law 
Despite claims to the contrary, it is not feasible for outside coun-
sel to be integrated into the day-to-day operations of a corporate 
client in a comparable fashion to in-house counsel.  Such integration, 
however, is essential to practicing strategic preventive law.  Business 
managers may also be reluctant to hire outside counsel for the pre-
ventive and preemptive work in which in-house counsel engage be-
cause they prefer to work with colleagues who are known, trusted, 
and easily accessible.  These relationships, or social capital, enhance 
the capacity of in-house counsel to engage in preventive law. 
B. How Do In-House Counsel Create Value? 
In-house counsel create value in a myriad of ways, but are nor-
mally associated with the transactional value they generate for busi-
ness organizations.  Over twenty years ago, Ronald Gilson asserted 
that business lawyers were, in essence, transaction cost engineers who 
created value by reducing transaction costs.
163
  Although helpful, Ro-
nald Gilson’s model for business lawyering is incomplete in two ways.  
One limitation is that Gilson’s scope of transactions is too narrow.  
He focuses on lawyers in “large acquisitions [and mergers], a highly 
specialized practice involving one phase of one-shot, arms’-length 
transactions” that are “at one end of a continuum of business law 
practice that ranges across repeat [or routine] transactions and rela-
tional contracts to internal transactions.”
164
  Another important omis-
sion from existing accounts of business-lawyer value creation is the 
absence of non-transactional sources of practice.
165
  The following ex-
amples, although not exhaustive, illustrate the broad scope of trans-
actional and non-transactional value created by in-house counsel. 
1. Transactional Sources of Value 
a. Standard Transactions 
The standard transactional categories for many large corpora-
tions are much broader than those envisioned by Gilson and others.  
For many large scale organizations, routine sales, services, real estate, 
strategic alliances (such as joint ventures, licenses, franchises, and dis-
 
 163 Gilson, supra note 23, at 293–94; see also COFFEE, supra note 8, at 192 (“The 
corporate lawyer functions in a very different capacity from the advocate . . . . [T]he 
corporate lawyer acts principally as a transaction engineer.”).  
 164 Dent, supra note 151, at 282.   
 165 See id.   
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tributorships), financing, intellectual property, and leasing transac-
tions are the life blood for the business enterprise and of greater im-
portance than infrequent or cyclical large acquisitions and mergers.
166
 
b. Internal Transactions 
There are also so-called “internal transactions” between various 
internal corporate constituencies (e.g., directors, shareholders, man-
agement, and employees) such as employment agreements that im-
pact business operations.
167
  Other examples of internal transactions 
include delegations of authority within the business enterprise as well 
as by-law amendments.
168
  The use of standardized terms and con-
tracting procedures also has internal governance implications for 
large companies with significant sales and procurement operations.  
Standardized terms and contracting procedures serve an important 
function by limiting the discretion of wayward, uninformed, and un-
authorized employees who might otherwise expose the corporation 
to onerous terms and risk. 
c. Relational Contracts 
The important role of relational contracts is often understated 
in the legal literature.
169
  But one cannot neglect that relational con-
tracts, characterized by cooperation and extensive future dealings, 
are an important part of business practice.  A company may have 
multiple linkages to third parties that influence its responses to con-
tractual disputes.  Consider the example of a chemical producer 
whose chief industry competitor is also a major customer or supplier.  
The chemical producer may seek to purchase product from its com-
petitor rather than produce its own due to product shortages or high 
internal costs of production.  This basic example illustrates how ties 
between businesses in certain industries are more complex and fluid 
 
 166 See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 146, at 13–15; see also U.C.C. §§ 2, 2A (2005). 
 167 See, e.g., Bradley T. Borden, Partnership Tax Allocations and the Internalization of 
Tax-Item Transactions, 59 S.C. L. REV. 297, 301–02 (2008) (discussing a skilled attor-
ney’s ability to create employment agreements resembling partnerships whereby an 
employee and corporation share profits). 
 168 Dent, supra note 151, at 292. 
 169 See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. 
REV. 1089, 1089 (1991) (discussing relational contracts and why they “do not easily fit 
the presuppositions of classical legal analysis”); see also George Baker et al., Relational 
Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 117 Q.J. ECON. 39, 39 (2002) (discussing the role of 
relational contracts in efficient ownership patterns).  
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than the legal literature often acknowledges.
170
  Accordingly, litigation 
in these contexts is often disfavored over negotiation and conces-
sions.  In-house counsel have the distinct advantage of understanding 
this business context and choosing among a range of tactics to 
achieve inter-temporal business objectives.
171
 
2. Non-Transactional Sources of Value 
As previously mentioned, another serious omission from existing 
accounts of business lawyer value creation concerns non-transactional 
sources of practice.
172
  The following examples, although not exhaus-
tive, reflect non-transactional sources of in-house counsel value. 
a. Legal Compliance 
i. Advancing Compliance Program Goals 
Compliance or regulatory costs can be viewed as a species of 
transaction costs, but the legal literature often makes a distinction.
173
  
For explanatory purposes, this Article will continue to observe this 
distinction.  In-house counsel add value by “understanding their 
clients’ regulatory concerns” and helping their client to conduct its 
business without compromising legal compliance.
174
  In-house counsel 
must not only display competency in relevant topical legal areas, but 
also must have intimate knowledge of the corporate client’s unique 
 
 170 See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 61 (1963).  The legal literature often assumes that litiga-
tion is the default option in business disputes.  But where relational contracts exist, 
the decision to litigate is not always so clear.  Professor Stewart Macaulay explains: 
     Disputes are frequently settled without reference to the contract or 
potential or actual legal sanctions.  There is a hesitancy to speak of le-
gal rights or to threaten to sue in these negotiations.  Even where the 
parties have a detailed and carefully planned agreement . . . often they 
will never refer to the agreement but will negotiate a solution when the 
problem arises . . . .  
Id.; see also Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 471 
(1985) (asserting that relational contracts weaken when the amount of money in dis-
pute is significant); David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 
HARV. L. REV. 373, 376 (1990). 
 171  See Rosen, supra note 92, at 487 (“Inside counsel possess knowledge of their 
clients that other lawyers—those who practice as free professionals—do not, and they 
use this knowledge to deliver high quality professional judgments on their clients’ 
behalf.”). 
 172 See Dent, supra note 151, at 282. 
 173 See Steven Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 486, 492 (2007). 
 174 Id. 
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business context and concerns.  This dual competency allows in-
house counsel to bridge the gap between legal promulgation and or-
ganizational implementation. 
Corporate Legal Compliance (CLC) is integral to the daily oper-
ations of large companies.  It often involves thousands of decisions 
made by various employees of the firm, throughout various regions of 
the world, over the course of a fiscal year.  In most cases, the CLC 
function is either absorbed into the in-house legal department func-
tion or is situated in a self-standing compliance department that 
works closely with in-house counsel.
175
  Moreover, in-house counsel, 
specifically general counsel, should regularly discuss compliance risks 
with senior executives and periodically brief the board of directors’ 
compliance committee on key risks, occurrences of noncompliance, 
and best practices.
176
  Other reasons to involve in-house counsel in the 
compliance process include promoting economies of scale, econo-
mies of scope, information economies, and preserving attorney-client 
privilege.
177
 
As a general matter, compliance systems bring material informa-
tion to management’s attention.
178
  Information networks and infor-
mation flows are key to effective governance, as illustrated by the rec-
ognized Caremark duties to implement a system of controls.
179
  
Common features of compliance programs include a code of con-
duct, monitoring systems, training, reporting, and investigative capa-
bilities.  Compliance programs create a paper trail that will ostensibly 
 
 175 See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 2, at 287 (“The legal department bears prima-
ry, though not exclusive, responsibility for compliance efforts.”); Daly, supra note 2, 
at 1065 (“[C]orporate clients [need] their general counsel to possess a substantive 
and procedural familiarity with the laws of other countries and to supervise compe-
tently the work of foreign in-house lawyers and outside law firms around the globe.”).  
 176 See E. Norman Veasey, Presentation to the Association of Canadian General 
Counsel, The New Realities for Chief Legal Officers of U.S. Public Companies, at 3–
5, 13 (Oct. 16, 2009) (discussing multiple roles of general counsel that go beyond 
meeting minimum legal requirements); NAT’L ASS’N CORP. DIRS. BLUE RIBBON 
COMM’N, RISK GOVERNANCE: BALANCING RISK AND REWARD App. B (2009). 
 177 See Schwarcz, supra note 173, at 493–94; see also infra Part IV.C.1. 
 178 See Langevoort, supra note 102, at 958 (“[T]here are two separate but related 
objectives built into the internal controls requirement.  One is to bring material in-
formation to management’s attention, the other to permit monitors like auditors or 
board audit committees to verify the quality of the information flow and processing 
by management.”). 
 179 See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 
1996).  The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines also underscore the importance of com-
pliance systems.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 (1991). 
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flag improper conduct.
180
  The panoply of rules and regulations that 
impact business enterprise are vast: global, national, and local.
181
  
Greater globalization of business enterprise has only added to the 
overall complexity of legal compliance.  Consequently, the systems 
necessary for compliance may differ according to jurisdiction, indus-
try, and operational context.  In certain instances, jurisdictional laws 
on the same issue may be inconsistent or provide minimal guid-
ance.
182
 
Director and senior executive oversight with respect to legal 
compliance is distinguishable from other forms of oversight that may 
occur on a more infrequent basis.
183
  The fluidity of business opera-
tions and context figure prominently into the CLC discussion.  Con-
sequently, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to compliance, and, as 
Donald Langevoort asserts, there are no meaningful benchmarks 
available to make comparisons and determine effectiveness.
184
  Such 
effectiveness may hinge on the industry, on the operational context, 
and on whose interests the compliance program is intended to 
serve—for example, regulator, corporation, or both.
185
  Ultimately, 
the form compliance programs take will likely stem from a type of 
 
 180 At times, this may appear at odds with companies seeking to limit litigation 
risk.  See Langevoort, supra note 102, at 972. 
 181 See Lamm, supra note 14. 
 182 Privacy regulation is an example.  See Robert Gellman, Conflict and Overlap in 
Privacy Regulation: National, International and Private, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: 
INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 255, 255–56 
(Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 2d ed. 1998) (1987) (“As national, internation-
al, and privately promulgated privacy rules expand, there is a real prospect of over-
lapping rules and direct conflict. . . . It becomes increasingly difficult to determine 
what rules apply to what institutions at any given time or for any set of transac-
tions.”). 
 183 See Veasey, supra note 13, at 1416–17 (describing categories of corporate deci-
sions). 
 184 Langevoort, supra note 102, at 955. 
 185 See Kristen K. McGuffey & Thomas C. Soldan, Right-Sizing: Customizing Com-
pliance to the Small Corporation, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE & ETHICS INSTITUTE 2007, at 
255, 255–59 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1595, 2007).  For 
example, “[a] company’s efforts to ‘effectively’ structure its compliance program . . . 
will only be tested by the government when misconduct occurs and the company 
comes under investigation for potential wrongdoing[,] . . . at a critical time, when 
potential illegalities have been identified and the compliance program is being re-
viewed under the microscope of a cynical group of prosecutors or regulators . . . .”  
Id. at 259.  Thus, when determining effectiveness of compliance programs, the indus-
try standards and the regulators may be more important factors than the corporation 
which created the program.  See id. 
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cost-benefit analysis conducted by management.
186
  This does not 
necessarily mean that cost-benefit analysis should always be the sole 
determinant for compliance decisions.
187
  To be candid, one-hundred 
percent compliance is not a realistic expectation for any compliance 
program in a complex organization.  Human participation guaran-
tees some degree of non-compliance.  A more pragmatic goal for in-
house counsel, and perhaps regulators, is to limit the amount of non-
compliance occurrences substantially.  In-house counsel are integral 
advisors to management in carrying out their oversight responsibili-
ties in an ever-changing regulatory environment.
188
  Assuming a com-
pany’s general counsel has dual reporting responsibilities to both the 
CEO and the board of directors, in-house counsel are well-positioned 
to prevent managerial transgressions and expose flaws in a company’s 
compliance systems.  Donald Langevoort contends that managerial 
incentives may exist to implement less-than-perfect systems.
189
  Cost is 
the most obvious incentive, but principal-agency issues are another 
plausible explanation.
190
  For example, corporate scandals reveal how 
senior executives may conceal risky decisions and opportunistic be-
havior, keeping the board ignorant, to preserve their discretion.  This 
scenario underscores the critical necessity for general counsels and 
in-house legal departments to foster an environment of ethical beha-
vior, self-reporting, increased transparency, trust, verification, and ac-
tive board engagement.  A well-functioning compliance program 
coupled with competent in-house counsel can help constrain mana-
 
 186 See Vincent Di Lorenzo, Does the Law Encourage Unethical Conduct in the Securities 
Industry?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 765, 766–67 (2006). 
The influence of cost-benefit evaluations on corporate behavior has 
been cast aside and, therefore, ignored under the Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance.  However, the evidence strongly suggests that corpo-
rations are not ignoring cost-benefit evaluations when making deci-
sions on legal compliance. . . . [C]orporate actors . . . view 
noncompliance with legal mandates as a reasonable decision. 
Id. 
 187 See generally SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT 
RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH (2003) (discussing alternatives to pure cost-
benefit approaches to decision making).  
 188 See DeMott, supra note 10, at 965 (“[A] general counsel furnishes advice to se-
nior management on major transactions or other situations.  The general counsel’s 
individual advisory role also encompasses discerning trends in the law and projecting 
their impact on the corporation.  Under normal circumstances, the general counsel 
also furnishes legal advice to the corporation’s board of directors.”); see also Gantler 
v. Stevens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 (Del. 2009) (extending potential liability to non-
director corporate officers such as general counsel).  
 189 See Langevoort, supra note 102, at 957–58. 
 190 See id. at 958. 
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gerial discretion and mitigate risk.  Moreover, the presence of an in-
ternal emboldened whistleblower may alter internal decision-making 
and discussion as well as temper “fast and loose” approaches to legal 
compliance.  Admittedly, circumstances may arise where a general 
counsel is ignored and even terminated because her position is at 
odds with senior managers.  Yet, this is a risk general counsels and 
other in-house counsel must assume.
191
  Professional integrity is non-
negotiable. 
In-house counsel perform both a routine monitoring (i.e., pa-
trolling) and a crisis intervention (i.e., firefighting) function to pro-
mote compliance.  In the former proactive approach, a well-
positioned in-house counsel can be more effective in addressing 
compliance risks than simply operating from a defensive or firefight-
ing posture; however, significant challenges remain.  Despite the best 
initial intentions, organizational path dependencies may create addi-
tional compliance issues.  For example, corporate compliance struc-
tures, once established, may become ineffective over time as an or-
ganization or its environment changes.
192
  Managerial commitment to 
compliance may also shift over time as management pays attention to 
other issues.  Change at this latter stage becomes much more expen-
sive and “resisted for both economic and cognitive reasons.”
193
  Con-
sider this basic illustration: Company X, a multinational conglome-
rate, acquires Company Y, a struggling petrochemical producer.  
Company X’s management, at this juncture, is primarily concerned 
with cost-cutting measures, improving plant yields, layoffs, and in-
creasing market share.  Revamping compliance systems during this 
transition period, although important, is not the top priority.  Here, 
in-house counsel can play a crucial role in mitigating legal risks and 
adapting compliance systems to a shifting business context and regu-
latory climate. 
ii. A Pragmatic Perspective on Legal Compliance 
The in-house counsel organizational experience illustrates the 
need for a pragmatic perspective on legal compliance.  The proposi-
tion that corporations should comply with the law and regulations is 
 
 191 See Heineman, supra note 51. 
 192 See Langevoort, supra note 102, at 961 (asserting that the best structure for 
compliance shifts over time). 
 193 Id. at 959. 
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neither new nor controversial.
194
  Excessive noncompliance creates 
negative externalities for third parties—as well as the corporation—in 
the short or long term.
195
  Laws and regulations as well as commercial 
norms and culture create the box or environment within which the 
corporate entity functions.  Yet commercial norms without legal in-
tervention could have disastrous results as the following H.L.A. Hart 
comments reveal: 
[N]either understanding of long-term interest, nor the strength 
of goodness of will . . . are shared by all men alike.  All are 
tempted at times to prefer their own immediate interests . . . . 
“Sanctions” are . . . required not as the normal motive for ob-
edience, but as a guarantee that those who voluntarily obey shall 
not be sacrificed by those who would not.
196
 
Conversely, commercial experience should, to a certain extent, in-
form legal structure.  In-house counsel are keenly aware of this ten-
sion given their dual competencies.  They are a pivotal force in ensur-
ing that bureaucratic companies (i) act in accordance with relevant 
laws through their business activities,
197
 and (ii) discourage business 
activity that might have the appearance of illegal or unethical con-
duct.
198
  The presence of law is necessary for the firm to operate and 
 
 194 See E. Norman Veasey & Christine Di Guglielmo, History Informs American Corpo-
rate Law: The Necessity of Maintaining a Delicate Balance in the Federal “Ecosystem,” 1 VA. L. 
& BUS. REV. 201, 203–04 (2006) (providing a concise history of American corporate 
law).  See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History, 106 
Colum. L. Rev. 1793 (2006) (discussing some of the federal interventions in corpo-
rate law over the past seven decades).   
 195 When analyzing social problems, debate often focuses on the distinctions be-
tween market solutions and regulatory ones.  Regulations are often deemed to im-
pinge upon free markets and private contracting.  Yet, when issues are framed in 
such a manner it distorts and underemphasizes the crucial role law or regulation 
plays in promoting freedom.  See Joseph W. Singer, Things that We Would like to Take 
for Granted: Minimum Standards for the Legal Framework of a Free and Democratic Society, 2 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 139, 141–42 (2008).   
 196 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 193 (1961); Williamson, Opportunism, supra 
note 5, at 98. 
 197 See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 2, at 284, 287 (“By monitoring business activi-
ties . . . the legal department can determine whether regulatory requirements are 
understood and met. . . . The legal department bears primary, though not exclusive, 
responsibility for compliance efforts.”). 
 198 See DeMott, supra note 10, at 981 (“One function usefully served by counsel is 
acting as the CEO’s ‘conscience,’ as a sounding board and source of sound judgment 
on questions in which ethical issues often shade legal determinations.”); Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, Jr., Ethical Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1011, 1021–22 (1997). 
The general counsel has made it clear . . . that his or her door is open 
for confidential discussion with any lawyer . . . who confronts an ethi-
cally troublesome situation. . . . The general counsel knows that being 
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function.
199
  Nonetheless, there remains considerable skepticism 
among business people about the role of law and lawyers.
200
  It often 
seems as if people “like the idea of law but shudder at the idea of be-
ing regulated.”
201
  Robert Clark reflects on the sources of business 
skepticism regarding legal compliance: 
Outside of litigation settings, one sometimes hears corporate 
managers and attorneys try to rationalize corporate noncom-
pliance with regulatory statutes by complaining that the evil of fi-
duciary duties to shareholders made them do it.  What they are 
complaining about, it seems to me, is not corporate law, which 
certainly does not tell them to break other laws in order to make 
their shareholders richer, but the unfortunate fact that if they do 
not take advantage of lax legal enforcement they may be ousted 
by aggressive managers who will.
202
 
This anti-regulation rhetoric, however, does not comport with institu-
tional reality where “state and federal statutes create a comprehensive 
network of regulations that set minimum standards for contractual 
relationships—minimum standards that we take for granted.”
203
 
A pragmatic approach to legal compliance falls within the ambit 
of what Robert Clark describes as “modest idealism.”
204
  The central 
premise of “modest idealism is that corporate managers should cause 
their corporation to comply with applicable laws and regulations even 
when noncompliance would increase the corporation’s net present 
 
open but tough-minded about ethical problems is much more effective 
than being sanctimonious. 
Id. 
 199 See, e.g., Singer, supra note 195, at 141. 
[T]he liberty we care about includes just laws.  The legal realists taught 
us that this truth also applies to the market.  The free market is not the 
war of all against all; it is a zone of social life structured by law.  The 
free market operates against a backdrop of regulations—regulations we 
too often take for granted. 
Id. 
 200 See Tom Alberg, Cost, Quality: Concerns of In-House Counsel, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 12, 
1988, at 15; see also Lisa H. Nicholson, SarbOx 307’s Impact on Subordinate In-House 
Counsel: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 559, 597 (2004) 
(“[S]ome view the law as an enemy, or an obstacle to overcome in order to forestall 
‘the negative drag on profits’ . . . . [C]orporations purportedly seek ‘can do’ individ-
uals who can tell them ‘how to do something,’ not restrict their wants . . . .”).  
 201 Singer, supra note 195, at 140.  
 202 CLARK, supra note 67, at 686. 
 203 Singer, supra note 195, at 150. 
 204 CLARK, supra note 67, at 684. 
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value.”
205
  Stated differently, managers should maximize long-term 
shareholder wealth subject to the constraint that the corporation 
meets its legal obligations.  Modest idealism makes the constraint of 
legal compliance less discretionary.  Under this approach, managers 
are not required to solely take into account cost-benefit analysis when 
deciding whether to meet legal obligations.
206
  To do so would pro-
vide justification for non-compliers resisting regulation.  A pure cost-
benefit approach supports the view that companies should be able to 
make a rational decision to “roll the dice” where noncompliance is 
profitable and courts should not condemn such conduct.
207
  To assess 
the efficacy of this approach, one need only consider the unfortunate 
situation where a board, upon undergoing a cost-benefit analysis, ap-
proves noncompliance with a regulation that later becomes disastrous 
for the implicated employees, shareholders, and corporate entity.  
Such a decision would run afoul of the current legal framework be-
cause an intentional board decision, if captured in a written record, 
could give rise to liability under Caremark.208 
There are prudent reasons for adopting Robert Clark’s so-called 
modest idealism approach to legal compliance, such as (i) reducing 
negative business side effects and curtailing negative externalities, for 
example, environmental pollution, health and safety to employees 
and third parties, monopolistic behavior, nuclear technology sold to 
terrorist organizations or rogue nations, and perhaps damage to a 
company’s reputation that may impact stock price and brand equity; 
(ii) limiting transaction costs, for example, by internalizing law and 
regulations companies limit the costs of enforcement to regulatory 
authorities; (iii) creating a more predictable business climate; and 
(iv) enhancing the legitimacy of legal institutions, regulators, and re-
 
 205 Id. at 684–85. 
 206 See id. at 685–86.  
 207 Under such circumstances, the corporation may opt to simply pay a fine.  But 
see Nicholson, supra note 200, at 597.   
Others view the law as a ‘neutral constraint,’ whereby the general 
counsel’s task is to objectively assess the risks and weigh the benefits as-
sociated with noncompliance, then to game the rules and work around 
the legal constraints.  If some constraints are unavoidable, the lawyer 
will advise breaking the rules and paying the penalty if the client can 
still make a profit. 
Id.  See generally SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 187 (exploring decision-making al-
ternatives other than cost-benefit analysis).  Taking such an approach raises addi-
tional problems because there are asymmetric types of harm and costs at issue. 
 208 See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 
1996). 
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viewing courts.
209
  This approach, however, is not above critique.
210
  
And the critiques may serve as exceptions that circumscribe the gen-
eral rule.  For example, one critique is that the line between legal and 
illegal conduct is not always black and white but often gray.
211
  Moreo-
ver, regulations may lag behind industry advances and may not ade-
quately address current or future circumstances, thereby leaving gaps 
and little real-time guidance for businesses.
212
  These critiques, how-
ever, do not outweigh the benefits of the modest idealism approach 
to legal compliance.  Here, imperfection is not synonymous with inef-
fectiveness. 
Although the key concern of CLC is to prevent corporate activity 
that falls short of applicable legal obligations, it is also important to 
note that businesses may decide to act in a manner that exceeds exist-
ing legal requirements and employ best practices.
213
  Other species of 
business risk, such as reputation and brand equity, may outweigh le-
gal risks.
214
  In this scenario, in-house counsel are in a special position 
to participate in a discursive process working within corporate teams 
and contributing to broader business strategies, thus assuring that le-
 
 209 See CLARK, supra note 67, at 687–88.   
 210 See id.  The key arguments against the modest idealism approach are two-fold.  
First, modest idealism may lack workability because of problems related to collective 
action.  Id. at 687.  There will be free riders and others who shirk responsibilities to 
profit (prisoner’s dilemma).  In reality, companies may act with both modest ideal-
ism and calculating opportunism to compete.  The second critique of modest ideal-
ism concerns the legitimacy of laws and regulations.  Id. at 688.  In other words, to 
what extent do such laws reflect optimal policy?  The lawmaking process is imperfect.  
The public choice literature debunks the myth that regulation is costless and univer-
sally reflects the public interest.  See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON 
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY (1962).  To the extent that companies have influence and an audience 
with legislators, the regulatory concerns of business are mitigated.  See Jill E. Fisch, 
How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The Fedex Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495, 1544−56 
(2005). 
 211 Cf. Veasey, supra note 176, at 13 (discussing the use of best practice guidelines 
by corporate officers and directors). 
 212 See generally Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Go-
vernance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (exploring the 
shift in legal thought about policy and regulating to a post-New Deal governance 
model of modern thought). 
 213 See Heineman, supra note 51 (discussing how global company standards on is-
sues may exceed legal requirements in certain jurisdictions).   
 214 See Alice M. Tybout & Michelle L. Roehm, Let the Response Fit the Scandal, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Dec. 2009, at 82, 87–88. 
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gal risks are addressed and best practices are employed in the busi-
ness process.
215
 
b. Litigation 
Although litigation is the largest legal service area outsourced to 
outside counsel, in-house counsel nonetheless play a significant role 
in the prevention or resolution of litigation matters.
216
  Litigation has 
both a proactive (i.e., offensive and preventive) and a reactive (i.e., 
defensive and mitigation) dimension. 
i. Proactive 
Litigation has important instrumental functions.  For example, 
litigation, or the threat thereof, can be used proactively for offensive 
and preventive purposes.  Without resorting to the actual filing of a 
claim, the simple threat or prospect of litigation may be enough to 
influence cooperative behavior such as bringing a party back to the 
bargaining table or making concessions.
217
  When threats alone are 
not sufficient, actual litigation may be necessary to promote business 
objectives and preserve corporate assets.  For example, domestic 
manufacturers of commodities like steel and aluminum may bring ac-
tions under protectionist U.S. trade laws to limit industry competition 
from foreign producers of like or similar products.
218
  Similarly, 
pharmaceutical and technology firms may vigorously implement an 
intellectual property strategy to preserve their investments in re-
search and development as well as protect and facilitate the commer-
 
 215 See discussion supra Part IV.A.3. 
 216 See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 2, at 291; Mary Thompson & Bridget Rienstra, 
In-House Counsel . . . And the Preservation of Privilege, HOUS. LAW., Jan–Feb. 1998, at 21, 
21 (discussing the desire of a corporation facing litigation to have its in-house coun-
sel take an active role in the investigation of the underlying facts). 
 217 See Loukas Mistelis, International Arbitration—Corporate Attitudes and Practices—12 
Perceptions Tested: Myths, Data, and Analysis Research Report, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 525, 
553 (1996) (“[C]orporations believe that many contractual arrangements may be 
appropriate to explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement, or at least a cooling-
off period of time, before the parties can resort to court or arbitration.”).  The mere 
threat of litigation may prove useful in inducing cooperation and accountability.  Cf. 
Elaine Draper, Preventative Law by Corporate Professional Team Players: Liability and Re-
sponsibility in the Work of Corporate Doctors, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 525, 592 
(1999) (discussing the health-care industry, but explaining that “[t]he threat of law-
suits tends to supplant strict regulation in many arenas and can be very useful in ex-
panding individual accountability, getting companies to curtail hazardous condi-
tions, and promoting beneficial social policies”).   
 218 See International Trade Administration Antidumping and Countervailing Reg-
ulations, 19 C.F.R. §351.101–215 (2010).  
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cialization of their products.
219
  Here, litigation functions as one of 
the many instruments used to pursue a broader business strategy. 
In-house counsel also add value by preventing costly litigation 
and regulatory exposure stemming from business activities.
220
  This 
preventive approach engages in-house counsel in early business dis-
cussions and strategy sessions.
221
  In-house counsel often help design 
compliance incentives that may decrease the required amount and 
cost of compliance oversight.  This ex ante approach is more effective 
at controlling litigation and regulatory risks than a more reactive 
“firefighting approach.”
222
 
 
 219 See, e.g., Arti K. Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual 
Property Strategies for Accelerated Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 7 
(2008); Dennis Fernandez & Mary Chow, Intellectual Property Strategy in Bioinformatics 
and Biochips, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 491, 492–93 (2003).  
 220 See Hazard, supra note 198, at 1021 (“The general counsel [in a well-run legal 
department] knows that early interception of legally improper conduct is much easi-
er than cleaning up a mess after the fact.”); Margaret Ann Wilkinson et al., Mentor, 
Mercenary or Melding: An Empirical Inquiry into the Role of the Lawyer, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
373, 379 (1996) (“Unlike the counselor-lawyer approach, no duty is imposed on the 
hired gun [outside] lawyer to ensure that the client’s decision to litigate is a though-
tful one.”). 
 221 See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 2, at 280–81 (asserting that since internal cor-
porate counsel have taken a preventative role, they are present as a matter of right at 
important business conferences). 
     A major part of programmatic preventive law is the education of op-
erating personnel whose daily duties and contacts determine the cor-
poration’s compliance . . . . By monitoring business activities, whether 
through limited, informal canvass, spot checks, or detailed and syste-
matic audit, the legal department can determine whether regulatory 
requirements are understood and met. 
Id. at 284. 
 222 See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 2, at 281. 
     The very existence of a properly established inside counsel pushes 
back the involvement of lawyers to an earlier phase of a transaction and 
shifts the mode from reactive to proactive. For example, when a corpo-
ration seriously contemplates an acquisition, the general counsel will 
participate in the early discussions, and will analyze, or engage outside 
counsel to analyze, possible legal complications—long before the deal 
is struck. 
Id.  See also Symposium, Business Lawyering and Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 
1, 9 (1995) [hereinafter Value Creation Symposium] (“Lawyers can often play a role in 
creating incentive structures that dampen the potential for opportunistic behavior. . . 
. [L]awyers can often create procedures and institutional structures that diminish the 
risks by either minimizing asymmetries or aligning incentives.”). 
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ii. Reactive 
Even where litigation, a compliance lapse, or crisis proves un-
avoidable, competent in-house counsel can be an invaluable corpo-
rate asset.  In-house counsel can mitigate legal and non-legal business 
risks during times of crisis because they have the ability to recognize 
how the confluence of legal and non-legal risks impact broader busi-
ness objectives.  In responding to a crisis, in-house counsel do not 
operate within a vacuum.  They interact with other functional units 
within the corporation, such as marketing and public relations, to 
address pressing issues.  Discursive team interaction and decision 
making is important because a proper response may require a com-
pany to go beyond its legal obligations and take additional action to 
preserve intangible corporate assets such as customer goodwill, polit-
ical capital, brand equity, and reputation.
223
  Thus, in-house counsel, 
individually and as part of a team of internal decision-makers, are 
more likely aware of these additional factors that may require extra-
legal responses. 
The response to the 1980s Tylenol cyanide scandal is an example 
of a corporation taking extra-legal measures to preserve corporate 
value.
224
  In that instance, McNeil Consumer Products, a subsidiary of 
Johnson & Johnson, knew that they were not responsible for the 
deaths of seven customers in the Chicago area but still exceeded their 
legal obligations by halting all advertising of Tylenol and recalling the 
product across the country.
225
  These steps amounted to the destruc-
tion of twenty-two million bottles of product and a loss of approx-
imately $100 million.
226
  In addition, Johnson & Johnson president 
James Burke, assisted by general counsel, “initiated a company wide 
effort to recommit managers to its credo” which promises to “put 
safety above profit.”
227
  Despite the magnitude and expense of this cri-
sis management response, it is regarded as a tremendous success and 
 
 223 See Tybout & Roehm, supra note 214, at 86–88. 
 224 See Steven Prokesch, Tylenol: Despite Sharp Disputes, Managers Coped, N. Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 23, 1986, at 1, 30; Peter Behr, Corporate Character, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1984, at 
D1.   
 225 See Edward Walsh, Tylenol Maker, Families Settle in Cyanide Deaths, WASH. POST, 
May 14, 1991, at A3 (“[T]he settlement involved no admission of culpability by John-
son & Johnson or McNeil Consumer Products.”); Prokesch, supra note 224. 
 226 Paul Betts, U.S. Group to Relaunch Tylenol Painkiller, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 
12, 1982, at 18; Jerry Knight, Tylenol’s Maker Shows How to Respond to Crisis, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 11, 1982, at 1. 
 227 Prokesch, supra note 224. 
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credited with preserving Tylenol brand equity and customer good-
will.
228
 
Another example is the response of Odwalla, Inc. to a juice con-
tamination crisis in 1996.
229
  During this crisis, Odwalla recalled its 
product, implemented a public relations strategy expressing concern 
for consumers who had become ill, worked with federal authorities to 
identify the problem, and ultimately, resolved the problem by im-
plementing a pasteurization process.
230
  Odwalla attorneys worked 
closely with FDA officials to institute an innovative “flash pasteuriza-
tion” process, which made the juice safer for consumers (i.e., elimi-
nating E. coli bacteria) without compromising taste or quality.
231
  
These efforts helped reinstate consumer and investor confidence in 
the Odwalla brand.
232
  The Odwalla experience reveals the benefits of 
a collaborative crisis response that combines public relations and le-
gal strategies.
233
 
These examples reveal the potential advantage in-house counsel 
may have when responding to a corporate crisis.  Specifically, in-
house counsel may possess a broader panoramic view of a crisis that 
extends beyond short-term legal and profit concerns.  This capability 
is an important facet of the in-house counsel role. 
c. Corporate Culture 
Although there is no agreed upon definition for corporate cul-
ture,
234
 the significant impact of in-house counsel on corporate cul-
 
 228 Oliver Moore, For Companies, Surviving a Recall Crisis Takes Forthrightness, GLOBE 
& MAIL (London), Aug. 26, 2008, at A9 (“The Tylenol case, which caused the prod-
uct to vanish from the shelves, has become a textbook example of crisis management 
. . . .”).  Not all attempts at crisis management prove successful.  See Tybout & Roehm, 
supra note 214, at 86–88. 
 229 See generally Kathleen A. Martinelli and William Briggs, Integrating Public Rela-
tions and Legal Responses During a Crisis: The Case of Odwalla, Inc., 24 PUBLIC RELATIONS 
REV. 443 (Winter 1998). 
 230 See id. 
 231 See id.  Furthermore, Odwalla attorneys took major steps to ensure compliance 
with the Hazard Analysis & Critical Control Points (HACCP) system the FDA man-
dates for juice pasteurization.  See “Freshology”, ODWALLA, 
http://www.odwalla.com/Freshology.jsp (last visited Jan. 7, 2011); Juice HACCP, FED. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/ 
HazardAnalysisCriticalControlPointsHACCP/JuiceHACCP/default.htm (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2011).  
 232 See Martinelli, supra note 229. 
 233 See id. 
 234 See, e.g., TOYOHIRO KONO & STEWART CLEGG, TRANSFORMATIONS OF CORPORATE 
CULTURE: EXPERIENCES OF JAPANESE ENTERPRISES 23 (1998) (“First, corporate culture 
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ture is unquestionable.
235
  Laws and procedures do not operate in iso-
lation.  Cultural norms may, in certain instances, constrain corporate 
misconduct better than external regulations.
236
  In-house counsel of-
 
aids simplification and adaptation.  It determines the best method of decisions. 
Second, it can foster affiliation and integration.  It can replace more explicit and im-
peratively framed management processes. Third, it encourages member motivation 
and activation. Shared values explain the meaning of working.”); Juan D. Carrillo & 
Denis Gromb, Cultural Inertia and Uniformity in Organizations, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
743, 743 (2007) (“Despite its relevance, organizational culture remains rather ill-
defined in economic theory.  In fact, its resistance to a precise description is one of 
its rare uncontroversial attributes.”); Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Corporate Culture and the 
Nature of the Firm, in TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND BEYOND 249, 255 (John Goe-
newegen ed., 1996) (“Corporate culture is more than shared information: through 
shared practices and habits of thought, it provides the method, context, values, and 
language of learning, and the evolution of group and individual competences.”); 
Donald C. Langevoort, Opening the “Black Box” of Culture in Law and Economics, 162 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 6 (2006) (“The primary role of corporate 
culture is to operate as a sense-making device that simplifies the cognitive tasks with-
in the group or organization, creating a buffer that gives priority to that which facili-
tates cooperative exchange among agents of the firm over that which is distracting or 
anxiety producing.”); Charles M. Yablon, Corporate Culture in Takeovers, 19 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 553, 553 (1997) (“By corporate culture, I mean that set of ineffable and hard 
to quantify variables like compatibility of management styles, strategic fit, and com-
plementary approaches to employee autonomy and decisionmaking structures . . . 
.”); Shin’ichi Hirota et al., Does Corporate Culture Matter? Evidence from Japan 25 (Wase-
da Institute for Advanced Study, Discussion Paper No. 2008-001, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1118196 (“Corporate culture, 
often viewed as unobservable,  ambiguous, and hard to measure by academics, is a 
crucial determinant of corporate policies and performance.  Japanese companies 
have long been thought to have derived competitive advantages from the corporate 
cultures that they have developed.”).  Donald Langevoot further explains:  
First, culture plays a simplifying role by identifying perceptions and 
behavior that need not constantly be negotiated in the endless interac-
tions among agents of the firm.  Absent a strong mechanism for de-
termining what can be taken for granted, far less productive work 
would get done in the firm.”  Secondly, these cultures “potentially add 
value, and should be seen as a counterweight to, not necessarily a ma-
nifestation of, group-level agency costs.   
Langevoot, supra, at 5.  
 235 Langevoort, supra note 234, at 81–82. 
One of the main objections to invoking corporate culture in rigorous 
legal analysis is that there is no clear definition of corporate culture.  
Ultimately, organizations are collections of individuals, who bring their 
own particular knowledge, preferences, and cognitive habits to work.  
Much socialization has occurred before any given person becomes part 
of the firm, and the boundaries between work and other spaces occu-
pied by that person are blurred so that other cultural influences will 
constantly compete with corporate culture, even at work. 
Id. 
 236 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral 
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1737–38 (2001); see, e.g., KONO & 
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ten serve as a sounding board for risk-prone ideas and, when appro-
priate, provide alternative options and opportunities for business 
clients.
237
  When equipped with adequate organizational standing and 
management support, in-house counsel also may reinforce a sense of 
order, authority, and legitimacy to corporate activities.
238
  In a sense, 
in-house counsel can function like a spiritual advisor, but not the 
sanctimonious variety.
239
  Perhaps the greatest impact in-house coun-
sel may have on the corporate organization is promoting a culture of 
legal compliance at the top, middle, and bottom rungs of the organi-
zation.
240
  In-house counsel effectiveness both shapes and is shaped by 
corporate culture.
241
 
 
CLEGG, supra note 234, at 13 (“Corporate culture integrates the behavior of organiza-
tion members, enabling them to adapt to changes in their environment.  A pattern 
of behavior also harmonizes behavior.  It can thus replace formal rules.”); Edward B. 
Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1608 
(2001) (“Norms may help explain the manner in which the law, in the absence of 
bright line rules, influences corporate governance.  Norms may also explain why 
standards rather than rules work well in a corporate setting.”).  Miriam Baer discusses 
two different forms of governance, a classical approach, and a more modern form, in 
which businesses are “governed” by a dominant culture that encourages compliance.  
See Baer, supra note 11, at 543 (“Whereas the classical governance approach relies on 
a combination of institutional structures, incentives, and sanctions to deter wrong-
doing . . . cultural governance theory relies on education, mediating institutions, and 
a more democratic workplace in which employees’ comments are solicited and va-
lued.”).  Rock and Wachter also explain, “[L]egal rules matter . . . not only in estab-
lishing the corporation’s charter and bylaws, but also in setting standards of behavior 
for directors and executive officers. At the same time, corporate law is more a set of 
default and enabling terms . . . .  [C]orporations can still follow their own norms and 
still do it ‘right.’”  Rock & Wachter, supra. 
 237 See Schwarcz, supra note 173, at 495. 
 238 See id.   
 239 See id. (comparing in-house counsel, in their role as guides to understanding 
legal social order, to spiritual advisors).  In-house counsel can prevent some situa-
tions which may create an unethical culture if left unattended.  See, e.g., Weaver, su-
pra note 154, at 1035.  
[C]orporate counsel should ensure that their clients understand the 
steps . . . require[d] if an agent or representative of the client persists 
in taking an action that is “a violation of a legal obligation to the organ-
ization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the 
organization.”  
Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1996)).  
 240 DeMott, supra note 10, at 955–56.  
Positioned as an officer within a corporation, a general counsel who is 
an influential member of the corporation’s senior management can 
help to shape its activities and policies in highly desirable directions, 
exercising influence that may extend well beyond the bare bones of en-
suring legal compliance.  A general counsel also may be uniquely well 
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There is not, however, a singular corporate culture.  Instead, 
there may be a dominant (or core) culture, subcultures, and coun-
tercultures operating within the same organization.  Anthropologists 
and sociologists first used the term “subculture” to describe culturally 
distinct communities that were part of larger societies.
242
  In the cor-
porate context, subcultures operate in a similar fashion within a 
broader dominant corporate culture.
243
  Countercultures, on the oth-
er hand, are subcultures with norms and behavior at odds with the 
dominant corporate culture and are generally undesirable.
244
  In-
house counsel effectiveness may depend on what cultural category—
dominant culture, subculture, or counterculture—legal compliance 
occupies and what category prevails in certain circumstances.  In-
house legal departments and other functional departments within an 
organization, such as finance and accounting, public relations, and 
 
positioned to champion a transformation of the organizational culture 
. . . . 
Id.   
 241 The addition of in-house legal departments encourages the formation of ethi-
cal cultures within organizations.  See Baer, supra note 11, at 542 (“The creation of 
the organization’s ethical culture is generated by the company’s directors and offic-
ers . . . by its lawyers and accountants . . . .”).  
[T]he corporate “tone at the top” that has, to date, most preoccupied 
the government is not the tone of transparency or procedural justice . . 
. management establishes with the company’s employees, but rather, 
the ‘tone’ the company’s general counsel adopts when he or she speaks 
with federal agents and prosecutors during the government’s investiga-
tion. 
Id. at 554. 
 242 See generally J. Milton Yinger, Counterculture and Subculture, 25 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL 
REV. 625, 625–28 (1960). 
 243 See KONO & CLEGG, supra note 234, at 13. 
[T]he greater the sources of differentiation between people, the great-
er the opportunities for subcultural formation . . . . The existence of 
subcultural groups may not necessarily be good or bad in its own right. 
In certain circumstances, such differentiation may lead to a fatal weak-
ness of strategic resolve and purpose; in others, pluralism can be a 
source of great strength. 
Id. 
 244 Id. at 16. 
The ‘counterculture’ is a culture that articulates against the philosophy 
and the policies of the corporation.  If the members believe that they 
should not try new things, because punishment will follow if failure re-
sults, or that they ‘should not work hard, because it will result in lay-offs 
by increased efficiency,’ they are members of a counterculture.  Coun-
tercultures often find support in factors such as labor unions that are 
antagonistic towards the firm. 
Id. 
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marketing, may form different subcultures, norms, and methods, but 
ultimately share in the broader corporate mission.
245
  Although some 
observers contend that a homogenous corporate culture is preferable 
for transacting business,
246
 a healthy mixture of the dominant culture 
and various subcultures is sometimes preferred.
247
  Indeed, cultural 
heterogeneity may bring about additional costs, but these may be 
outweighed by the enhanced adaptive capabilities of a more hetero-
genous organization.
248
 
Within the organizational context, managers at the top are cru-
cial to the formation of healthy corporate cultures of legal com-
pliance.  But managers may also perpetuate harmful countercultures 
that lead to opportunism and other vices at odds with the dominant 
culture.
249
  Nonetheless, the presence of an in-house legal department 
may embed and reinforce a culture of legal compliance or, at a min-
 
 245 Id. at 93. 
An example of the processes by which subcultures develop is the case 
where different goals are assigned to different departments as part of a 
common strategy, for instance, an organization might request the re-
search department to develop a new shared basic technology thereby 
encouraging creativity, and simultaneously ask the development de-
partment to develop successful new products, thereby encouraging a 
customer orientation. 
Id. 
 246 Carrillo & Gromb, supra note 234, at 765 (“[A] more homogenous cultural 
structure provides the organization’s agents with better incentives to undertake cul-
ture specific investments, which improves the organization’s performance.”).  Carril-
lo and Gromb further state:  
In organizations in which multiple cultures coexist, agents have weaker 
incentives to undertake culture-specific investments.  Conversely, cul-
tural uniformity is more conducive to such investments. . . . [There-
fore,] the gains associated with cultural diversity must be weighted [not 
only against the costs of restructuring but also] against the cost of re-
duced incentives. 
Id. at 759. 
 247 KONO & CLEGG, supra note 234, at 98 (“A desirable mixture of dominant cul-
ture and different subcultures is one that results in better performance by the organ-
ization and satisfaction of the members.”).   
 248 Carrillo & Gromb, supra note 234, at 759. 
 249 See Douglas M. Branson, Enron—When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or 
Roadmap to Corporate Governance Reform?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 989, 991 (2003). 
Enron, our other governance imbroglios, the political and market reac-
tions thereto and all the other fallouts have led to creative destruction 
of the ‘winner’s culture,’ ‘the good deal exemption’ culture and the 
‘rising tide floats all boats’ (and covers up mistakes and opportunism) 
culture. . . .  Later in the 1990s . . . that culture constituted the real 
cancer in our system of corporate governance. 
Id. 
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imum, influence corporate actors to consider the legal ramifications 
of their decisions.  Legal observers who remain skeptical of the in-
house counsel role in corporate governance need only ponder what 
corporate culture would be like in the absence of in-house counsel, 
with only rationally-bound, third-party gatekeepers, regulators, insti-
tutional investors, and other corporate constituents to rein in corpo-
rate opportunism. 
d. Mediation 
In-house counsel, particularly general counsel, may also perform 
an important function of mediating between different corporate con-
stituencies to resolve internal corporate disputes.
250
  In-house counsel 
are perhaps well suited for this function because they develop a 
broad panoramic view of corporate problems that extends well 
beyond provincial departmental concerns and legal expertise.  In-
house counsel integration with corporate activities makes such medi-
ation possible. 
C. Who are the Internal and External Beneficiaries of In-House 
Counsel Value? 
The in-house counsel value inquiry extends beyond the mere 
question of how in-house counsel create value, to determining who 
are the beneficiaries of this value.  The primary recipient of value 
provided by in-house counsel is the client corporation.
251
  But in-
house counsel generate significant transactional and non-
transactional value, even if indirectly, for a broader set of internal 
(e.g., management, shareholders, and employees) and external (e.g., 
customers and government regulators) corporate constituents.
252
  
Failure to acknowledge how in-house counsel generate value for mul-
tiple corporate constituencies negatively distorts the analysis of in-
house counsel impact. 
 
 250 See Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 39, at 6. 
 251 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2007); see also Schwarcz, su-
pra note 7, at 500 (describing the client corporation as the primary client for in-
house and outside counsel). 
 252 Cf. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 146, at 7–10 (noting the various ways in 
which lawyers can create value by acting as “transaction cost engineers”). 
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1. Internal Corporate Constituencies 
a. Managers: Directors and Senior Executives 
As a respected member of the management team, in-house 
counsel, acting as general counsel, keep managers abreast of legal 
risks throughout the organization.
253
  Their intimate knowledge of the 
organization and legal acumen makes them an important part of the 
overall information flow within a corporation that assists corporate 
managers in carrying out their duties and tasks.
254
  Although report-
ing structures across companies might vary, general counsel normally 
have multiple channels of formal and informal communication with 
senior executives and board members through the appropriate board 
committees.
255
  Anecdotally, the growing number of general counsels 
ascending to the chief executive officer position is perhaps a reflec-
tion of the perceived value of in-house counsel expertise and expe-
rience.
256
 
 
 253 See DeMott, supra note 10, at 960 (“[C]ost pressures, standing alone, do not 
explain the enhanced prominence of general counsel as a member of senior man-
agement . . . . One explanation for general counsel’s enhanced managerial stature is 
the nature of the advisory services that general counsel may provide . . . .”). 
 254 See Rosen, supra note 92, at 487 (“Inside counsel can use the information, or-
ganizational power, and trust they obtain from being part of the client organization 
to participate in corporate planning, anticipating legal problems and maintaining 
legal compliance.”); Johnson & Garvis, supra note 12 (discussing the in-house coun-
sel’s role in advising managers on their fiduciary duties); ABA Task Force on Corpo-
rate Responsibility, Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Respon-
sibility, 59 BUS. LAW. 145, 161 (2003) (“Public corporations should adopt practices in 
which . . . [g]eneral counsel meets regularly and in executive session with a commit-
tee of independent directors to communicate concerns regarding legal compliance 
matters, including potential or ongoing material violations of law by, and breaches of 
fiduciary duty to, the corporation.”). 
 255 CAROL CREEL & JAMES R. HILTON, AM. CORP. COUNSEL ASS’N, SPECIAL REPORT: 
THE VIEW FROM THE TOP 8, 10 (2002). 
General counsel report to the company CEO in nearly three-quarters 
of the reporting companies.  COOs, executive vice presidents, and 
CFOs manage general counsel in approximately 20 percent of the re-
porting companies.   
     Virtually every respondent indicated that general counsel are consi-
dered to be among the top executives in their organizations; over 90 
percent placed them among the top 10 executives. 
Id. at 10. 
 256 See Mark Curriden, CEO Esq., A.B.A. J., May 2010, at 30, 30. (investigating why 
lawyers are being asked to lead some of the nation’s largest corporations).  As of May 
2010, nine attorneys serve as CEO at Fortune 50 corporations: Brian Moynihan of 
Bank of America (J.D., Notre Dame Law School), David Dillon of Kroger (J.D., 
Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law), Frank Blake of Home Depot 
(J.D., Columbia Law School), Edward Rust, Jr. of State Farm (J.D., Southern Method-
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b. Shareholders. 
In-house counsel promote long-term shareholder value in a 
number of ways.
257
  Three important methods through which this val-
ue is achieved include (i) promoting economies of scale and scope, 
(ii) strengthening information economies, and (iii) minimizing 
agency costs.
258
 
i. Economies of Scale and Scope 
Generally, “[a]n economy of scale is the savings resulting from 
the greater efficiency of large-scale processes.”
259
  In-house counsel 
can achieve economies of scale and greater efficiencies compared to 
outside counsel especially through repetitive transactions (e.g., sales 
of commodities and licensing) and even major deals.
260
  The exposure 
of in-house counsel to repetitive transactions and the business envi-
ronment fosters the development of unique expertise and skills not 
readily available in the external marketplace at an acceptable price.  
These acquired skills and expertise can also promote economies of 
 
ist University Dedman School of Law), Angela Braly of WellPoint (J.D., Southern Me-
thodist University Dedman School of Law), C. Robert Henrikson of MetLife (J.D., 
Emory University School of Law), Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman Sachs (J.D., Harvard 
Law School), Jeffery Kindler of Pfizer (J.D., Harvard Law School), Jeff Smisek of 
Continental Airlines (J.D., Harvard Law School) and W. Bruce Johnson of Sears 
Holdings (J.D., Duke University School of Law).  See id. at 35.  Other notable CEOs 
who once served as general counsel or have legal backgrounds include: Gerald Levin 
of AOL Time Warner, Richard Parsons of Time Warner, Charles Prince formerly of 
Citigroup, Kenneth Chenault of American Express.  See Mike France, A Compelling 
Case for Lawyer-CEOs, BUS. WK., Dec. 13, 2004, http://www.businessweek.com/ 
magazine/content/04_50/b3912101_mz056.htm. 
 257 In-house counsel create shareholder value by enabling corporations to take 
advantage of economies of scale and scope. See Value Creation Symposium, supra note 
222.  
Many economic transactions in which lawyers play a critical role involve 
pooling the production or consumption facilities of different parties so 
that the unit cost will drop as a function of increasing volume or range 
of activities.  Creating or preserving the structures that capture such 
economies is an important source of value creation. 
Id. 
 258 Shareholder value is created through in-house counsel’s control of outside 
counsel billing procedures.  See Rosen, supra note 92, at 511 (“Inside counsel certain-
ly can play a role in keeping a rein on outside fees.  They can explain to the corpora-
tion why more expensive lawyering is not necessarily better given their needs.”).  The 
examples below are mere illustrations and by no means an exhaustive list of in-house 
counsel value to shareholders.  Moreover, the following examples may not exclusively 
benefit shareholders but may accrue to other corporate constituents.    
 259 Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 506. 
 260 See id. at 506–07. 
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scope.
261
  Although similar to economies of scale, economies of scope 
generally pertain to the savings and efficiencies created by in-house 
counsel involvement in multiple corporate functions (e.g., com-
pliance, risk management, government relations).
262
  This may in part 
explain why the corporate compliance, human resources, and corpo-
rate secretary functions report to the general counsel in certain com-
panies. 
ii. Information Economies 
In-house counsel enhance long-term shareholder value by pro-
moting economies of information exchange that are an integral part 
of effective governance.
263
  With access to internal control mechan-
isms as well as ongoing internal relationships, in-house counsel can 
gather information more efficiently and at a lower cost, allowing 
them to conduct more precise ex ante and ex post evaluations of cor-
porate legal performance.  Otherwise, the external acquisition of this 
information could be costly and increase veracity risks, where “infor-
mation may be filtered and possibly distorted to the advantage of the 
[third party service] firm that has assumed the information collection 
responsibility.”
264
 
 
 261 John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Economies of Scope, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 268, 
268 (1981). 
     Several years ago we coined the term ‘economies of scope’ to de-
scribe a basic and intuitively appealing property of production: cost sav-
ings which result from the scope (rather than the scale) of the enter-
prise.  There are economies of scope where it is less costly to combine 
two or more product lines in one firm than to produce them separate-
ly.  While the concept itself is not completely novel, especially since 
multi-product firms are the rule rather than the exception in our 
economy, we have attempted to make this terminology precise, both in 
common parlance and in theoretical analyses. 
Id. 
 262 Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 508–09. 
     An economy of scope represents the savings resulting from having 
the same investment support multiple profitable activities in combina-
tion rather than separately.  This hypothesis predicts that in-house 
counsel who are already familiar with their company’s regulation and 
its organizational and operational structure may be able to achieve 
economies of scope by avoiding the learning curve of having to be-
come educated about these matters. 
Id. 
 263 See Williamson, Vertical, supra note 8, at 113–14, 119–20. 
 264 Id. at 120. 
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iii. Agency Costs 
In-house counsel provide value to shareholders by mitigating two 
primary varieties of agency costs: (i) agency costs between manage-
ment and ownership, and (ii) agency costs between the corporation 
and outside legal providers.  With respect to the former variety, in-
house counsel are important to helping managers (i.e., directors and 
officers) fulfill their oversight duties.
265
  With respect to the latter va-
riety, in-house counsel limit agency costs through practices such as 
monitoring and convergence.
266
 
c. Employees 
The presence of in-house counsel benefits rank-and-file em-
ployees in the sense that employees have a sounding board to discern 
the legal implications of their own conduct as well as that of others.  
Without the internal presence of in-house counsel, employees are left 
to make their own interpretations and justifications of appropriate 
conduct.
267
  Under such circumstances, employees may simply co-opt 
the views espoused by superiors and more experienced co-workers. 
2. External Constituencies 
a. Regulators 
In-house counsel perform an important internal regulatory func-
tion that consists of monitoring, formulating company procedures 
and policies, and enforcement.
268
  This internal regulatory function 
lowers the monitoring costs for government actors.
269
  In a sense, the 
 
 265 See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 505 (“According to this hypothesis, in-house 
counsel are in a better position than outside counsel to observe any misbehavior by 
company managers.”); discussion supra Part IV.B.2.a. 
 266 See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 506 (“Being part of the client organization, in-
house counsel can monitor outside counsel, ‘question fees, deny disbursements, and 
insist on strict case management procedures.’”) (quoting LARRY SMITH, INSIDE 
OUTSIDE: HOW BUSINESSES BUY LEGAL SERVICES 173 (2001)); see also discussion supra 
Part IV.C.1.b.iii. 
 267 See Duggin, supra note 119, at 394 (“While the deference accorded to com-
pliance advice from corporate counsel has undoubtedly increased in the post-
Sarbanes-Oxley world, corporate lawyers, especially in-house counsel, must work hard to 
keep lines of communication with employees open.”) (emphasis added). 
 268 See Baer, supra note 11, at 525. 
 269 Government officials can lighten the load for their regulators by merely en-
couraging cultures of corporate compliance.  See Baer, supra note 11, at 547–48 (ex-
plaining that the government through policies and regulations, including the presi-
dent through speeches, has encouraged companies to have higher ethical standards 
as well as effective compliance programs). 
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Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, SEC up-the-ladder 
reporting regulations, and other federal regulations, with their em-
phasis on internal compliance programs, attempt to deputize, or at 
least acknowledge, the necessity of internal actors like in-house coun-
sel in their attempts to promote law-abiding conduct.
270
  Specifically, 
section 307 of the SOX Act addresses minimum standards for lawyers 
and part 205 of the regulations establishes more detailed require-
ments for when lawyers must report evidence of material violations 
up the corporate ladder and when they may report outside to the 
SEC.
271
  There is a presumption that corporate compliance programs 
can more cheaply and effectively regulate corporate employees than 
external regulators who face information and resource constraints.
272
  
Without willing and competent in-house counsel, the efforts of regu-
lators are, without question, less effective.  The following statement 
by Senator John Edwards during the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley debates on 
the Senate floor highlights this concern: 
The truth is that executives and accountants do not work alone.  
Anybody who works in corporate America knows that wherever 
you see corporate executives and accountants working, lawyers are 
virtually always there looking over their shoulder.  If executives 
and/or accountants are breaking the law, you can be sure that 
part of the problem is that the lawyers who are there and involved 
are not doing their jobs.
273
 
b. Customers 
Customers, and society, also benefit from the presence of in-
house counsel.  Outside counsel are less likely to possess institutional 
history and industry knowledge that might mitigate against a sub-
optimal course of action.
274
  For example, in-house counsel with a pa-
noramic view of company operations are more likely to consider oth-
er business concerns, such as customer goodwill, that may require 
company actions that exceed mere legal compliance with express 
 
 270 Arlen, supra note 101, at 835 (asserting that corporations are better suited than 
government to detect certain crimes); Baer, supra note 11, at 525–26 (“The in-house 
lawyers who supervise compliance programs are often referred to as ‘[p]rivate attor-
neys general.’” (quoting Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate 
Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 342 (2007))). 
 271 See 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006); 17 CFR pt. 205 (2010) (implementing section 307 
of the SOX Act). 
 272 See Baer, supra note 11, at 525–26. 
 273 148 CONG. REC. S6524-02, S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. 
Edwards) (emphasis added). 
 274 See e.g., Prokesch, supra note 224.     
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contractual provisions and looking beyond short-term profit de-
clines.
275
  In certain instances, in-house counsel are more likely to be 
non-adversarial and consider customer relationship concerns than 
their external counterparts. 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
In addition to providing a robust descriptive assessment of the 
in-house counsel role, our theory has important implications for cor-
porate governance, the legal profession, legal education, and further 
research. 
A. Looking Inward: Corporate Governance from the Inside-Out
276
 
Our theory of the in-house counsel role has important norma-
tive implications for corporate governance.  Namely, it highlights the 
need for legal scholars and regulators to look inward at internal go-
vernance mechanisms.  In-house counsel function as a type of corpo-
rate governance mechanism to address agency cost problems, partic-
ularly corporate opportunism.
277
  In the absence of opportunism, “all 
of the following would vanish: moral hazard, adverse selection, shirk-
ing, filtering, undisclosed subgoal pursuit, distortions, and all other 
strategic deceits.”
278
  Whereas other corporate governance mechan-
isms, such as shareholder voting, director independence, disclosure, 
and third-party gatekeepers, have all been explored by legal observ-
ers, the innkeeper inquiry is in its infancy.
279
  The study of corporate 
governance, however, should not overlook or discount the influence 
of internal legal actors who implement law in a complex business en-
 
 275 See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.b.ii.  Although not the focus of this article, in-
house counsel also provide a valuable social function for non-profits and NGOs. 
 276 Portions of this section were recently published in Omari Simmons, Corporate 
Governance Reform as a Credence Service, 5 J. BUS. & TECH L. 113 (2010). 
 277 See infra app. fig.2; see also Williamson, Opportunism, supra note 5, at 97  (defin-
ing opportunism as “self interest seeking with guile.”).  Agency costs within a firm 
that might be characterized as a particular species of transaction costs are often ig-
nored in the value-creation analysis.  See Geoffrey Miller, From Club to Market:  The 
Evolving Role of Business Lawyers, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1105, 1109 (2005) (discussing 
this omission in Gilson’s model of attorneys as transaction cost engineers).  Another 
shortcoming of the value-creation literature is that it often excludes self-interested 
conduct or opportunism from the transaction cost analysis.  See STEPHEN M. 
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 27 (2002) (asserting that in corporate 
law the greatest transaction costs are “uncertainty, complexity, and opportunism”).  
 278 Williamson, Strategy, supra note 5, at 1099. 
 279 See infra app. fig.1. 
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vironment.
280
  The role of in-house counsel is not simply to promote 
compliance with the law, but also to assist corporations with their 
broader objectives and strategies on an ongoing basis.
281
  To be clear, 
a lawyer must understand the relevant business context in order to 
adequately detect and solve problems.
282
  More than any other legal 
professionals, in-house counsel work from the frontlines of the busi-
ness enterprise and, among lawyers, arguably have the greatest im-
pact on corporate governance.
283
  Whereas the legal literature often 
downplays the operational aspects of business enterprise, the theory 
articulated herein recognizes the routine functioning of business op-
erations and context.
 284
  In-house counsel do not operate in a legal 
vacuum but must consistently weigh both legal and business concerns 
in a dynamic environment plagued with uncertainty.  This dual com-
petency enables in-house counsel to develop a pragmatic understand-
ing of business strategies (both short term and long term), risk-
management initiatives, global operations, and the relevant legal en-
vironment.  Well-positioned innkeepers, especially when comple-
mented by external gatekeepers, are an essential feature of healthy 
corporate governance in large corporate firms.
285
 
1. Bias Versus Benefit 
Legal observers often question whether a general counsel, who, 
in large part, is hired by the CEO, can exhibit the requisite indepen-
dence to pursue the corporation’s interests.  Meanwhile, little atten-
tion is given to the various benefits in-house counsel generate.  Me-
chanisms such as remuneration formulas emphasizing value-based 
 
 280 Delaware courts only recently recognized that fiduciary duties attach to corpo-
rate officers in addition to directors.  See Gantler v. Stevens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 (Del. 
2009). 
 281 See Derek Hayes, Consultant, Strikeman Elliot, Address at the Canadian Centre 
for Ethics and Corporate Policy: How do Ethical Standards Apply to In-House Coun-
sel? (May 23, 2002) (“In addition to the opinions on legal questions, the lawyer may 
be asked for or expected to give advice on non-legal matters such as business, policy 
or social implications involved in a question or the course of action that the client 
should choose.”). 
 282 Dent, supra note 151, at 310. 
 283 See Johnson & Garvis, supra note 12, at 1119. 
 284 Moreover, there are significant differences across industries that may require 
different corporate governance mechanisms or a mixture thereof.  The current fi-
nancial crisis is a prime example. 
 285 See Williamson, Strategy, supra note 5, at 1090 (“The efficacy of governance is 
thus jointly determined by local efforts (self-help to craft mechanisms) and as a func-
tion of the institutional environment (polity; judiciary; laws of property and con-
tract).”).  
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compliance metrics, restricted stock with holding periods, enhanced 
severance, and sign-on bonuses could be used to align in-house coun-
sel interests with the corporation’s, as well as embolden in-house 
counsel to police corporate opportunism.  Even if one were to as-
sume in-house counsel lack sufficient independence, they are not the 
only parties subject to bias.  Just as internal corporate actors may be 
too close to problems to think critically about them and thereby 
prone to provincialism, lawmakers and other outside observers may 
rely on crude, readily available heuristics, such as share price, that do 
not provide adequate insight into the health of a corporate organiza-
tion.
286
  
Outside observers like regulators and third-party gatekeepers of-
ten, out of necessity, look at aggregated, readily available informa-
tion, but may fail to adequately identify problems at an operational or 
micro level.  Moreover, an outside regulator or gatekeeper’s mindset 
may be at odds with internal corporate values that are important to 
the internal organization, like trust and loyalty.
287
  Organizational 
theorists such as Oliver Williamson have touted the advantages of in-
ternal governance mechanisms such as access to internal machinery 
and information.
288
  More recently, new governance theorists have ar-
ticulated the advantages of decentralization, and more specifically, 
the principle of subsidiarity.
289
  Orly Lobel describes the principle of 
subsidiarity: 
As a guiding principle of social organization, subsidiarity main-
tains that all governmental tasks are best carried out at the level 
closest to those affected by them.  Central authorities should leave 
the widest scope possible for local discretion to fill in the details 
of broadly defined policies.  Those closest to the problem possess 
the best information leading toward a potential solution.  There-
fore, the specific elaboration and application of common stan-
dards needs local knowledge to reach the desired objectives.  Lo-
cal entities are consequently understood to be more properly 
situated to manage functions by which they are affected than a 
dominant central organization [or regulator].
290
 
 
 286 See Langevoort, supra note 49, at 807. 
 287 Baer, supra note 11, at 535–36.  See generally TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND 
HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD (2006) (discussing the abuse 
of trust and honesty in American society and the need for a cultural shift in Ameri-
can attitudes). 
 288 See generally Williamson, Vertical, supra note 8; Williamson, Strategy, supra note 5.  
 289 See Lobel, supra note 212, at 382. 
 290 Id. at 398. 
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2. Harnessing In-House Counsel Expertise 
The need for in-house counsel expertise is further underscored 
by the fact that the current capabilities of corporate regulators simply 
do not match those of the regulated.  Existing reforms often lag far 
behind industry trends and transformations.  Consequently, regula-
tors are often regulating historic problems rather than current or fu-
ture issues on the horizon.
291
  Matching the capabilities of regulated 
entities and keeping up with all industry trends and transformations 
is perhaps too ambitious, but closing an unacceptable gap is not.  To 
help address this gap, corporate lawmakers should harness internal 
industry expertise. 
Lawmakers, by harnessing the internal expertise of in-house 
counsel in the design of corporate reforms, may (i) create a symme-
trical de-biasing mechanism offsetting or countering predictable out-
sider biases;
292
 (ii) prevent unintended consequences and promote 
more pragmatic, flexible, current, and forward-looking solutions; (iii) 
enhance the legitimacy of resulting reforms; and (iv) provide balance 
that may deter hasty decisions that are inconsistent with internal cor-
porate norms and would dampen productivity, risk taking, and en-
trepreneurship.
293
  Moreover, intimate knowledge of industry specific 
operational processes could assist regulators in prospectively identify-
ing risky business practices and perhaps fraud.
294
  Boosting the inter-
nal capabilities and industry specific expertise of regulators is not 
synonymous with regulatory capture or self-regulation; it is a neces-
sary step to enhance lawmaker effectiveness.  Our theory envisions a 
strong external regulatory presence but recognizes the limits of ex-
ternal mechanisms to adequately control corporate opportunism.
295
  
This approach also envisions a broader ex ante and ex post role for law-
yers characterized by multi-disciplinary engagement and adaptation 
in diverse social arenas.
296
 
 
 291 See id. 
 292 Langevoort, Human Nature, supra note 49, at 807. 
 293 See Baer, supra note 11, at 571. 
 294 See Pamela H. Bucy, Information as a Commodity in the Regulatory World, 39 HOUS. 
L. REV. 905, 941 (2002) (“Knowledgeable insiders can identify abuses that public 
regulators do not even know to look for.”). 
 295 See infra app. fig.2. 
 296 See Lobel, supra note 212, at 406. 
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Despite the aforementioned benefits, internal knowledge of op-
erational practices is often taken for granted.
297
  Some of the most 
prominent corporate scandals over the past decade have concerned 
operational issues that arguably could have been detected earlier or 
perhaps even prevented had regulators possessed intimate knowledge 
of corporate operations across industry sectors.  Consider Eliot Spitz-
er’s famed investigation of Citigroup and other Wall Street banks that 
unraveled abusive practices between equity research and invest-
ment banking units.
298
  Here, operational cross-selling practices and 
conflicts figured prominently into the former New York attorney 
general’s investigation.
299
  More recently, AIG’s operational practices 
involving the sale of largely unregulated credit-default swap deriva-
tives to numerous counterparties not only subjected AIG to excessive 
risk requiring a federal bailout but also introduced significant insta-
bility into the broader financial system.
300
 
The above examples illustrate the importance of internal opera-
tional knowledge and the information asymmetry that exists between 
regulators and internal corporate actors.  Addressing this asymmetry 
requires ongoing interaction between lawmakers and internal actors 
such as in-house counsel.  This type of interaction differs from stan-
 
 297 For example, corporate finance, although important, is usually a means to 
achieving operational ends.  Similarly, mergers are often conducted for operational 
benefits such as achieving economies of scale, expanding research and development, 
and boosting sales capabilities.  See Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Con-
siderations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580, 1599–1600 (1983) 
(“[O]perating efficiencies such as those derived from economies of scale, resource 
allocation, technological complementarities . . . and various kinds of transaction-cost 
economies . . . [are likely to arise] from horizontal or vertical mergers . . . .”).   
 298 See Citigroup Proposes Rules Limiting Conflicts, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2002, § 3, at 4 
(reporting that Mr. Spitzer investigated analysts at Salomon and Morgan Stanley who 
tailored their public opinions of companies to win lucrative banking work for their 
firms).  See generally BROOKE A. MASTERS, SPOILING FOR A FIGHT (2006) (providing de-
tailed information about Spitzer’s investigations into several corporations, including 
Citigroup).  
 299 See MASTERS, supra note 298, at 262; Patrick McGeehan, Spitzer Sues Executives of 
Telecom Companies Over ‘Ill Gotten’ Gains, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2002, at C1 (reporting 
that Mr. Spitzer prosecuted former top officials of five telecommunications compa-
nies for steering investment banking business to Citigroup in exchange for inflated 
ratings on their companies’ stock and new shares of other companies). 
 300 See Mary Williams Walsh, A.I.G. Lists Firms to Which It Paid Taxpayer Money, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2009, at A1 (explaining that AIG’s investments in subprime mortgag-
es, credit default swaps, and other shaky loans exposed the company to high risk, 
and, when AIG’s investments turned sour, the stability of the entire financial system 
was jeopardized). 
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dard lobbying, notice, and comment procedures.
301
  Instead, the de-
sired type of interaction is more discursive, continuous, cooperative, 
and interactive, where “[i]ndustry is expected to participate as part of 
a search for common goals, not just rigidly asserting its narrow eco-
nomic or political interests.”
302
  This perspective finds theoretical 
support in transaction cost economics, organizational theory, cultural 
and norm-based theories of corporate governance, as well as new go-
vernance theories of institutional reform that promote decentraliza-
tion, subsidiarity, and inside-out perspectives.
303
 
In-house counsel are an essential facet of healthy corporate go-
vernance, and our theory of the in-house counsel role highlights the 
need to harness both internal and external expertise to achieve 
pragmatic corporate governance responses and reform.  A more de-
tailed analysis of the precise mechanism through which in-house 
counsel might interact with lawmakers and other corporate consti-
tuencies is beyond the scope of this Article; however, new governance 
theorists have articulated a range of alternatives, for example, various 
types of agency advisory groups.
304
 
B. The Legal Profession 
Our theory of the in-house counsel role has significant implica-
tions for the legal profession, particularly concerning the delivery of 
corporate legal services by both internal and external lawyers. 
1. In-House Counsel 
A greater corporate focus on the strategic in-house counsel role 
articulated herein will lead to enhancements in the reputation and 
status of in-house counsel within the broader legal profession, among 
academics, law firms, and judges.  But most importantly, it will lead to 
more pragmatic and effective legal resolutions to business issues.
305
  
 
 301 See generally, Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice and Comment 
Rulemaking Requirements Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 317 (1989) 
(discussing the possibility of reconciling case law and administrative action regarding 
the Administrative Procedure Act); Lobel, supra note 212, at 390. 
 302 Lobel, supra note 212, at 377.  
 303 See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 287, at 152–60; Blair & Stout, supra note 236, at 
1737–38; Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L. J. 1457, 1495 (2005); Lawrence E. 
Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-Capitalist Society, 24 J. CORP. L. 869, 869 
(1999); Williamson, Strategy, supra note 5, at 1090 (discussing the efficacy of joint in-
ternal and external governance); see also Lobel, supra note 212, at 382.   
 304 See generally Lobel, supra note 212. 
 305 See discussion supra Part IV and V.A. 
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As Ronald Gilson acknowledges: “For those concerned about the fu-
ture of the professional project, the growing prominence of inside 
counsel within the profession, reflecting their market power, is not a 
threat but an opportunity, perhaps our only one.”
306
  These advance-
ments, however, are conditioned on the presence of the following 
two factors: (i) a shared understanding between management and in-
house counsel as to the latter’s role, and (ii) lawyer competence. 
a. A Shared Understanding Between Management and In-
House Counsel Concerning the Latter’s Role 
If in-house counsel are to provide the valuable role described 
above, the corporation, particularly management, must grant in-
house counsel the freedom to exercise objective and balanced judg-
ment.  On the other hand, if management views in-house counsel as a 
“rubber stamp,” “a necessary evil,” or an “internal police force ob-
structing business,” significant value will be lost and management 
pressure may potentially distort lawyer judgment.  The critical factor 
here is not independence per se, but rather a shared understanding 
between corporate management and in-house counsel as to the lat-
ter’s role.  This understanding can be reinforced through appropri-
ate internal mechanisms such as remuneration formulas that emphas-
ize key metrics developed to enhance value creation.  Effective 
reporting relationships are also critical.  The general counsel must 
report to the board of directors or, at least, the CEO.  Anything less 
than this will inhibit the functioning of the value-creation attributes 
that are vital to in-house counsel effectiveness.
307
 
b. Competence 
Management’s endorsement of the in-house counsel role is ne-
cessary but not sufficient.  It is absolutely essential that in-house 
counsel behave and are perceived to behave in ways that justify their 
presence.  This is largely a question of competence.  If in-house 
counsel are, in fact, simply failed or second-rate private practitioners, 
as observed in the opening paragraph of this Article, there is little 
hope that they will be capable of fulfilling the complexities of their 
 
 306 Gilson, supra note 5, at 916. 
 307 See Sue Reisinger, Talk to Me: Bank of America GC Now Reports to CEO as Part of 
Shake Up, CORP. COUNS., Jan. 14, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/ 
cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202437913504&Talk_to_Me_Bank_of_America_GC_Now_
Reports_to_CEO_as_Part_of_ShakeUp (describing a situation where it was important 
for the general counsel to report to the CEO). 
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value-creation role.  As previously mentioned, the skills needed for 
the in-house role, whether at the general counsel level or at other or-
ganizational levels, are not the same as those required of outside 
counsel, and therefore, require additional development and training.  
With enhancements in the reputation of in-house counsel coupled 
with economic factors, one might expect barriers to recruiting highly 
competent in-house lawyer staff to diminish.  The ability to recruit 
highly competent in-house lawyers could be a function of a number 
of corporate factors, including the reputation or financial health of 
the company, the remuneration structure, work-life balance, and the 
overall career path offered.  Historically, high caliber lawyers may 
have perceived the options offered by outside law firms, including 
better remuneration, the degree of challenge, specialization in the 
legal work, and reputational enhancement, as more attractive.  To-
day, however, companies often offer in-house lawyers compensation 
packages, particularly stock options and other risk and reward incen-
tives, which make the compensation for in-house lawyers quite com-
petitive without demanding the type of client development work that 
outside lawyers practice incessantly.  In light of the current economic 
climate, in-house legal departments are becoming an even more at-
tractive career choice due to their work-life balance and focus on val-
ue rather than billable hours.
308
 
2. Outside Law Firms 
Our theory of the in-house counsel role also has several implica-
tions for external legal service providers, but the most important 
among these are enhanced competition for client business and legal 
personnel, greater corporate client emphasis on value creation, and 
trusted partnerships with outside law firms.  The days of the “bes-
poke” lawyer with bargaining power over the corporate client are 
numbered.
309
  Corporate clients focused on value creation are requir-
 
 308 See Alex Williams, No Longer Their Golden Ticket, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2010, at 
ST1. 
 309 Wilkins, supra note 6, at 727 (quoting RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? 
RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES (2008)); see also Larry E. Ribstein, The 
Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 760 (2010).  
[T]he alternative to buying outside is ‘making’ in-house—in this case 
by hiring in-house counsel to provide direct legal advice and informa-
tion about outside lawyers. When clients have the technical expertise to 
dispense with specialists and can figure out on their own which indi-
vidual lawyers are reliable and meet their specific needs, they will have 
less need to buy outside legal services based on personal relationships 
with individual lawyers or to rely on a stable of ‘preferred provider’ Big 
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ing even greater oversight of their outside legal providers as well as 
encouraging the adoption of value-based metrics and internal con-
trols by once poorly managed outside law firms.
310
  Innovations such 
as law firm partnering and convergence can be viewed as attempts to 
extract more value from outside firms via more ongoing, mutually 
beneficial, relationships that provide greater opportunities for law 
firms to develop more in-depth knowledge concerning the client’s 
business.
311
  Similarly, David Wilkins posits that the traditional “agency 
model is no longer a helpful template for understanding the rela-
tionship between corporations and their outside [law] firms.”
312
  In-
stead, Wilkins identifies a current trend toward client relationships 
resembling strategic alliances that corporate clients share with other 
types of suppliers.
313
  Today, the relationships between in-house coun-
sel and outside counsel are less adversarial, and the trend is toward 
viewing outside law firms more as trusted partners and extensions of 
the internal corporate legal function. 
C. The Legal Education Project 
The above examination of in-house counsel raises an important 
question concerning the appropriate role of legal education.  Name-
ly, does (or can) legal education provide appropriate training for in-
house lawyers?  The traditional legal education model has been criti-
cized for its narrow focus.
314
  Indeed, changes are needed and being 
made to provide students with a broader view of the legal profession 
and practice by encouraging students to think like lawyers and func-
tion as lawyers.  Legal observers have recommended different ap-
 
Law firms.  The increased role of in-house counsel is therefore a signif-
icant threat to Big Law. 
Id. 
 310 See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, 
General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 
559, 565–69 (2002) (discussing the development of ethics compliance specialists in 
law firms); Elizabeth Chambliss, The Professionalization of Law Firm In-House Counsel, 84 
N.C. L. REV. 1515, 1551–76 (2006). 
 311 See THE NEW REALITY: TURNING RISK INTO OPPORTUNITY THROUGH THE DUPONT 
LEGAL MODEL 2 (Silvio J. Decarli & Andrew L. Schaeffer eds., 5th ed. 2009).  DuPont 
was one of the first companies to take this direction and a large number of compa-
nies have followed.  Wilkins, supra note 6, at 695.   
 312 Wilkins, supra note 6, at 672–73. 
 313 See id. 
 314 See generally WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR 
THE PROFESSION OF LAW 186 (2007) (suggesting improvements in legal education).  
Portions of the book are available at http://www.carnegiefoundation.org 
/sites/default/files/publications/elibrary_pdf_632.pdf. 
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proaches to educating business lawyers.
315
  These observations are in-
structive but not definitive.  Observers such as Ronald Gilson contend 
that the interdisciplinary aspects of business lawyering require a 
greater emphasis on finance, transaction cost economics, and skills 
courses such as drafting and negotiation to prevent lawyers from be-
ing displaced by other service providers.
316
  Other legal observers have 
taken the position that law schools on their own are not well posi-
tioned to provide the technical level of knowledge business lawyers 
need to be at the forefront of their profession.
317
  But not all observers 
view the case method and legal focus as ineffective training.  Steven 
Schwarcz highlights the value of applying legal concepts to real world 
problems through the case method.
318
 
To a degree, all of the above proposals have merit, but one can-
not discount the enduring value of “real” experience to hone valua-
ble innkeeper skills that have both behavioral and technical dimen-
sions.  Experience and expertise are not necessarily the same.
319
  The 
strategic in-house counsel role adds value precisely because it is fun-
damentally different from the largely tactical role of outside law 
firms.  Legal education must recognize this reality and provide foun-
dational academic instruction as well as training for the in-house 
counsel role.
320
  These steps have the potential to significantly en-
hance the competence and reputation of in-house counsel. 
 
 315 See Dent, supra note 151, at 318; see also Ribstein, supra note 309, at 814. 
The use of law in finance, the increasing importance of in-house coun-
sel, lawyers’ increasing roles within businesses, and the combination of 
law with other types of expertise, among other developments, create a 
demand for lawyers who can function within business rather than just 
delivering technical legal advice from the outside. Law school there-
fore may need to offer more business background in both advanced 
seminars and basic courses like business associations, securities regula-
tion, antitrust, and bankruptcy. 
Id. 
 316 Gilson, supra note 23, at 301–05. 
 317 Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342, 
352–53 (2005). 
 318 Schwarcz, supra note 173, at 507–08; see also Dent, supra note 151, at 286; Karl 
S. Okamoto, Teaching Transactional Lawyering, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 69, 109–11 (2009). 
 319 Lobel, supra note 212, at 454 (explaining the distinction between experience 
and expertise and the limits of the latter). 
 320 See generally SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 314. 
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D. Further Areas for Research 
Historically, the in-house counsel role has been under-theorized 
in the legal literature.  A key goal of this Article has been to advance 
the discussion concerning the in-house counsel’s rise to promi-
nence—an area that remains ripe for further scholarly exploration.  
Further research of the in-house counsel role may explore issues such 
as (i) factors influencing in-house law department effectiveness; (ii) 
qualitative assessments of in-house counsel professional identity; (iii) 
the use of incentives, such as remuneration to embolden and align in-
house counsel interests with those of the corporation; and (iv) im-
proved metrics for assessing in-house counsel impact on corporate 
entities and external constituencies.  The issue of improved in-house 
counsel value metrics is particularly important to our theory.  As the 
above discussion illustrates, in-house counsel generate value in my-
riad ways that are both tangible and intangible.  Yet the preventive 
aspect of the in-house counsel role, at times, makes the measurement 
of in-house counsel value akin to measuring anti-terrorism efforts.  
Simply viewing in-house counsel efficacy from the perspective of 
whether there has been a scandal, a mishap, or mistake does not ade-
quately capture the benefits of in-house counsel value creation.  In-
stead, meaningful in-house counsel value metrics, even if indirect, 
should be empirically studied across companies and industries.  The 
results of this exercise could lead to the development of metrics that 
better align with in-house counsel value creation.
321
 
Ultimately, further study of the in-house counsel role is impor-
tant because it has the potential to advance the understanding of 
modern corporate governance, provide novel insights concerning the 
efficacy of legal education, and illuminate key trends and transforma-
tions in the legal profession.  In-house counsel will inevitably be at 
the forefront of key legal and business developments for years to 
come generating greater attention from legal observers. 
 
 
 321 Such metrics are likely to differ depending on the particular source of value 
(e.g., compliance, litigation, commercial transactions) and can be objective, subjec-
tive, tangible, or intangible.  For example, in the compliance arena, a company 
might measure how many training sessions and audits are conducted as well as how 
many issues are averted through whistleblowers.  Meanwhile, in the commercial 
transaction context, companies may balance objective criteria such as the number or 
size of transactions with subjective feedback from business clients to gauge value. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure 1 
THREATS TO CORPORATE VALUE 
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Figure 2 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
 
 
 
 
 
